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RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL ACTIONS*
FLEMING JAMES, JRf1
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO JuRY TRUtL
THE federal Constitution guarantees the right to jury trial in civil actions in
federal courts,' and nearly every state constitution contains a similar guaranty.2
While there are some differences among these provisions, they have been given
an essentially uniform effect for the purpose under discussion here. They do
not extend but preserve the right of jury trial as it existed in English history
at some past time, either in 1791 when the seventh amendment was adopted 3
or, in the case of the states, at the date of the first state constitution.4 And at
such times not all civil matters were tried to a jury. Issues in actions at law
were so tried, with some exceptions; issues in suits in equity were not, unless
the chancellor in his discretion sent an issue to a jury for an advisory verdict.*
Many new rights and remedies have, of course, been created since the adop-
tion of the federal and state constitutions. In devising new remedies the legisla-
ture has considerable latitude to determine whether they shall carry a right
to jury trial.6 The legislature may even abolish a common law remedy, such as
the former action by a servant against his master for injuries caused by the
*This article is from the author's treatise on civil procedure soon to be published by
Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Massachusetts.
tLafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII.
2. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 21. Colorado and Louisiana
have no constitutional quaranty of jury trial in civil actions. COLO. CoNsr. art. 2, § 23; M1iller
v. O'Brien, 75 Colo. 117, 233 Pac. 1088 (1924); LA. CoNST. art. 1, § 9.
3. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476 (1935); Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295
U.S. 654, 657 (1935).
4. See, e.g., People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 287, 231 P2d 832, 835
(1951) (The constitutional right to jury trial ".. . is the right as it existed at common law
at the time the [State] Constitution was adopted... and what that right is, is a purely
historical question, a fact which is to be ascertained like any other social, political or legal
fact.... It is necessary, therefore, to ascertain what was the rule of the English common
law upon this subject in 1850").
Some of the states which were not among the thirteen original colonies interpret their
constitutional provisions as preserving the constitutional right as it had existed in the
territory when identical to the right secured by the Seventh Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, except as it has been modified by later constitutional provision. See, e.g.,
Whallon v. Bancroft, 4 Min. 109 (1860) ; St. Paul & S.C. R.R. v. Gardner, 19 Minn. 132
(1872).
5. Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1855); Meriden Sav. Bank v.
McCormack, 79 Conn. 260, 64 Atl. 338 (1906); Kimball v. Connor, 3 Kan. 410 (1866);
Brown v. Heller, 30 N.M. 1, 227 Pac. 594 (1924).
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 4849 (1937) (Congress
may provide for administrative finding of unfair labor practice under the Wagner Act, to-
gether with administrative determination that reinstatement of discharged employee with
award of back pay was proper remedy, without impairing Seventh Amendment).
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latter's negligence, and substitute for it an entirely new system of compensa-
tion for all industrial injuries to be administered by a board or commission
which will determine factual disputes without resort to either court or jury.,
But there are probably limits beyond which a legislature may not go. If a
legislature creates a right to be redressed by an action which is analogous to
a common law action (e.g., for a penalty such as treble damages, or for com-
pensatory damages caused by wrongful death), it probably may not deprive the
parties to the action of a right to jury trial,8 unless the new right is given
against the sovereign and therefore involves a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Where the legislature says nothing about how a new remedy is to be tried,
the courts fit it into the nearest historical analogy to determine whether there
is a right to jury trial."
One other aspect of the constitutional guaranty of jury trial should be noted.
It has been uniformly construed as a right which may be waived by the parties.
Statute or court rule may therefore prescribe reasonable conditions for obtain-
ing jury trial, such as timely demand, and may provide that failure to take
these steps constitutes a waiver."1
7. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Cunningham v. North-
western Improvement Co., 44 Mont. 180, 119 Pac. 554 (1911); State ex rel. Davis-Smith
Co. v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101 (1911).
8. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830). ("By common law, they
[framers] meant ... not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old
and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and deter-
mined, in contradistinction to those. . ." recognized only in equity or admiralty. "Probably,
there were few, if any, states in the Union, in which some new legal remedies, differing
from the old common-law forms, were not in use; but in which ... trial by jury inter-
vened...."
See also Fleitmann v. Welsbach Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) ; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R.,
162 Fed. 354, 357 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908) (treble damage actions under antitrust laws triable to
jury) ; Olearchick v. American Steel Foundries, 73 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Pa. 1947) (action
for overtime compensation under Fair Labor Standards Act triable to jury) ; Bellavance V,
Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D. Mass. 1939) (The United States patent
".... statutes afford two remedies-first, an action on the case to recover damages for in-
fringement of the patent, R. S. § 4919, 35 U.S.C.A. § 67. Such an action, of course, is one at
law and would entitle the parties to a jury trial.") ; Innersprings, Inc. v. Joseph Aronauer,
Inc., 27 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1961) (in action for patent infringement . . . when dam-
ages only are sought the action is one at common law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment").
See the interesting opinions of Judges Friendly (for the majority) and Clark (dissent-
ing in part), in Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1961).
9. See, e.g., the Federal Tort Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958) ; N.Y. Court of
Claims Act both of which provide for determination of fact issues without a jury. Cf. Auff-
mordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890).
10. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) (statutory suit to cancel naturalization
certificate for fraud not triable to jury) ; Strelitz v. Surrey Classics, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 101
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (proceeding to compel reemployment of discharged soldier not triable to
jury) ; 5 Moopx, FEDzRAL PRAcricE 38.11 [7] (2d ed. 1951).
11. Some constitutions expressly provide for waiver. See, e.g., the California pro-
visions cited supra note 2. Others, like the Seventh Amendment and the Connecticut con-
stitutional provision (supra note 2) do not. Under either type, there seems to be no doubt
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The federal courts and most state courts hold that there is no constitutional
barrier to legislative or judicial extension of jury trial to issues which were
formerly equitable.12 A few state constitutions provide for an extension of
jury trial beyond those issues allotted to a jury by history;13 few others have
construed their constitutions as guaranteeing the right of non-jury trial of
equitable issues.14
A. The Historical Test
Thus, most constitutions preserve the right to jury trial upon what may be
called a historical test.'5 The question then arises whether this freezes the right
absoultely as it was in England in 1791 (for example), or whether it has some
elasticity so as to accommodate extensions or contractions of jury trial and,
if so, what the limits of this elasticity may be. Some aspects of this question
have probably not had the attention they deserve and have not received clear
about the constitutionality of providing for waiver of jury trial unless unreasonable condi-
tions are placed upon obtaining it. Bennett v. Hillman, 37 Cal. App. 586,174 Pac. 362 (1918) ;
McKay v. Fair Haven & IV. R.R., 75 Conn. 608, 54 Atl. 923 (1903) ; James, Trial by Jury
and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YAIX L.J. 1022, 1024-25 (1936). The Supreme
Court probably believed that reasonable conditions can constitutionally be put upon obtain-
ing a jury since rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, promulgated by the Court,
provides for jury waiver unless a party makes a timely affirmative jury claim; cf. Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
For a case holding specific conditions to be unreasonable, see La Bowe v. Balthazor, 180
Wis. 419,193 N.W. 244 (1923) ($24 fee in municipal court with civil jurisdiction not to ex-
ceed $1,000).
12. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) ; Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v.
Chemi-Cord Proc. Co., 294 F.2d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Hurwitz v. Hurwitz, 136 F.2d
796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1943). For state cases, see, e.g., Phillips v. Gorham, 17 N.Y. 270
(1858) ; Ely v. Early, 94 N.C. 1 (1886) ; Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31
N.C. L. REv. 157 (1953); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176,
1179 (1961).
13. TExAs Co NsT. art. 5, § 10. North Carolina has so interpreted her constitutional pro-
vision. Lee v. Pearce, 68 N.C. 76 (1873). There were decisions in Arizona, Massachusetts,
and New Hampshire, all now overruled, which so construed the constitutional provisions
in those states. Georgia and Tennessee have statutes of long standing which provide for
jury trial of issues of fact in equity cases. Other states have also experimented with this
practice only to abandon it. The whole subject is admirably set forth in Van Hecke, Trial by
Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C. L. REv. 157 (1953).
14. Brown v. Buck, 75 Mich. 274,42 N.W. 827 (1889); State v. Nieuwenhuis, 49 S.D.
181, 207 N.W. 77 (1926) ; Callanan v. Judd, 23 Wis. 343 (1868) ; Van Hecke, Trial by
Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C. L. Rnv. 157, 164, 166, 167, 171 (1953) (stating that there were
seven such states and one federal circuit); Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HAnv.
L. REv. 1176 (1961).
15. The seventh amendment provides that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
.:' In the states which have them ".... the constitutional guarantees of jury trial in civil
cases usually are phrased in strong but not very detailed language. The constitutional authors
generally were content to provide that trial by jury 'shall remain inviolate forever, 'shall re-
main inviolate', 'shall be secured', 'shall remain as heretofore', etc.... At least implicitly
the purport is that the right shall remain in substance as it was when the state constitutional
provision was adopted." LouxsuL AD HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON P.LADIU; AND
PRocE:D RE 938 (1962). See also cases cited supra, notes 3 and 4.
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answers in judicial decisions. The following considerations should be noted as
bearing on the problem.
The doubts run in both directions. It is true that most constitutions do not
forbid legislative or perhaps judicial extension of jury trial right beyond the
constitutional right.16 But the question here is a different one: whether the
constitution should be so interpreted as to extend the constitutional right itself
beyond the strict historical pattern.
Before the adoption of the constitutions the line between law and equity
(and therefore between jury and non-jury trial) was not a fixed and static
one. There was a continual process of borrowing by one jurisdiction from
the other; there were less frequent instances of a sloughing off of older func-
tions. An instance of the latter may be seen from early petitions asking the
Chancellor to grant ordinary legal remedies because of the corruption or
political impotence of the regular courts, a branch of equity jurisdiction that
withered and died in the fifteenth century.'1
.. In the course of time many matters and issues worked over into law from
equity. The growth of general assumpsit, "especially that implied contract,
so highly beneficial and useful, of having undertaken to account for money re-
ceived to another's use," had already become in Blackstone's time a legal action
"almost as universally remedial as a bill in equity."' 8 Many matters such as
duress, fraud, illegality, and perhaps even payment of a specialty, which had
once been cognizable only in equity,'0 were familiar defenses to a legal action
by the end of the eighteenth century.
On the other hand, chancellors came to try an ever-growing number of is-
sues which once they had left to be tried at law. There was a time, for in-
stance, when equity was reluctant to grant specific performance where the exis-
tence of the contract was disputed; the parties, it was thought, should settle
such disputes at law.2 0 Later equity courts had no hesitation about deciding
for themselves whether there was a contract.2 1 Again the notion developed
that if a ground for equitable relief existed, equity would not stop with the
16. Supra note 13.
17. 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 405, 406 (7th ed. 1956); MAITAUl,
EQUITY 5, 6 (2d ed. 1936) ; WALSH, EQUITY Ch. 2 (1930).
18. 3 BLACKcSTONF, COMMENTARmES 432 (hereinafter cited as BLAcKSToNE). Holds-
worth thought that Blackstone exaggerated the extent to which law and equity had drawn
together. Holdsworth, Blackstone's Treatment of Equity, 43 HARv. L. Rv. 1 (1929). But
nothing in Holdsworth's comments impairs Blackstone's authority for propositions in the
text.
19. See exposition in Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YALE L.J. 645 (1923) ; cf. Hinton,
Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes, 18 MIcH. L. REv. 717 (1920).
20. Huddleston v. Briscoe, 11 Ves. Jr. 583, 32 Eng. Rep. 1215 (Ch. 1805) ; cf. Colson
v. Thompson, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 336 (1817) ; Waters v. Howard, 1 Md. Ch. 112 (1847).
21. Altoona Elec. Eng'r & Supply Co. v. Kittaning & F. C. St. Ry. Co., 126 Fed. 559
(W.D. Pa. 1903) ; Canister Co. v. Leahy, 182 F2d 510 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Rash v. People's De-
posit Bank & T. Co., 192 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951); Fraser v. Geist, I F.R.D. 267 (E,D.
Pa. 1940) ; Mahon v. Bennett, 81 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo. 1948).
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granting of equitable relief but would (at least if plaintiff wished) 22 decide all
aspects of the controversy, and this would often include issues which were
ordinarily for the law courts.23 Thus, if a plaintiff sought reformation of a
contract for mutual mistake, the chancellor, if he found mutual mistake, would
not only reform the contract but also try any remaining issues which would
determine whether damages should be awarded for breach of the contract as
reformed, and decree payment of the proper amount.2 4 Ordinarily, where the
ground for equitable relief failed, the bill would be dismissed and the parties
left to seek in the common law courts whatever legal remedies remained.2
But in 1786 an equity court decided not to dismiss the bill but to retain juris-
diction for the granting of legal relief where the ground for equitable relief
(specific performance) failed only because of defendant's wrongful conduct
after the suit was begun 2 6 This granting of substituted legal relief in equity
enjoyed a limited expansion after that 2 7
The borrowing by each jurisdiction from the other was not accompanied by
an equivalent sloughing off of functions.2 8 This led to a very large overlap
between law and equity. Many facts-fraud in the inducement, for instance-
22. That it was at plaintiff's option, seems clear from Whitchurch v. Golding, 2 P. NVms.
541, 24 Eng. Rep. 852 (Ch. 1729) ; Dormer v. Fortescue, 3 Atk. 124, 26 Eng. Rep. 875 (CI.
1744) ; 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 71, 82, 83 (14th ed. 1918).
23. Parker v. Dee, 2 Ch. Cas. 200, 22 Eng. Rep. 910 (C. 1674) ; Middletown Bank v.
Russ, 3 Conn. 135 (1819) ; Rathbone v. Warren, 10 N.Y. 587 (1813) ; sources cited .rupra
note 22.
24. 1 SToRY, EQu-TY JURISPRUDENCE § 161 (14th ed. 1918) ; Imperial Shale Brick Co.
v. Jewett, 169 N.Y. 143,62 N.E. 167 (1901).
25. Dowell v. Mitchel, 105 U.S. 430 (1881) ; Linden Inv. Co. v. Honslain Bros. Co,
221 Fed. 178 (8th Cir. 1915); 1 PommRaoy, EQUITY JURISaUDENx §§ 237d, 237f (5th ed.
1941).
26. Denton v. Stewart, 1 Cox Ch. 258, 29 Eng. Rep. 1156 (Ch. 1786). See also Todd
v. Gee, 17 Ves. Jr. 273, 34 Eng. Rep. 106 (Cb. 1810) ; Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232,
255 (1870).
27. Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Saperstein v. Mechanics &
Farmers' Say. Bank, 228 N.Y. 257, 261, 126 N.E. 708, 709 (1920) ; McLennan v. Church,
163 Wis. 411, 158 N.W. 73 (1916) ; Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested
Orientation, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 320 (1951); 1 PoMERoY, EQurry JURIsPRUDENCE § 237
(5th ed. 1941).
28. Eyre v. Everett, 2 Russ. 381, 382, 38 Eng. Rep. 379 (CI 1826) ("[T]his court will
not allow itself to be ousted of any part of its original jurisdiction, because a court of law
happens to fall in love with the same or a similar jurisdiction.... ) ; Sweeny v. Williams,
36 N.J. Eq. 627, 629 (1883). ("When courts of law have of their own notion extended
their jurisdiction over cases theretofore solely cognizable in equity, the jurisdiction of the
latter courts has been in no respect abridged, although when the jurisdiction at law has be-
come well established, the equity jurisdiction has in some cases declined."; 1 Po .,or,
EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 276-281 a (5th ed. 1941). Pomeroy concludes: "The enlargement
of the jurisdiction at law, by the ordinary process of legal development, has not, in general,
affected the pre-existing jurisdiction of equity." Id. at 618.
See also Kemp v. Pryor, 7 Ves. Jr. 237, 249, 32 Eng. Rep. 96, 101 (Ch. 1802) ; Toulmin
v. Price, 5 Ves. Jr. 235, 238-39, 31 Eng. Rep. 563, 565 (Ch. 1800) ; Viele v. Hoag, 24 Vt. 46
(1851).
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might have been presented and decided either at law or in equity, depending on
the context in which they arose.29 It also meant that the rubric which precluded
equitable relief when the remedy at law was adequate ceased to have any claim
to universal or even general validity, although it continued to be applied in
some situations. Blackstone noted that every bill in equity suggested the in-
adequacy of legal remedy, but continued: "But he who should from thence
conclude that no case is judged of in equity where there might have been relief
at law, and at the same time casts his eye on the extent and variety of the
cases in our equity reports, must think the law a dead letter indeed."80
This process of borrowing continued in American jurisdictions, to some ex-
tent at least, even after the constitutions were adopted. The issue of fraud in
the inducement as a defense to an action on a specialty worked over into law
during the nineteenth century.8' During the same century courts of equity
came to try disputed issues of contract vel non (in specific performance),82
nuisance vet non (in suits to enjoin nuisances), 8 and even, in some states,
title vel non (in suits to enjoin trespasses).84 The notion of substituted legal
relief in equity enjoyed, as we have seen, 85 a limited extension during the
nineteenth century. For the most part these steps were taken without any in-
dication that the courts were aware of the constitutional problems which the
steps involved. But the New York Court of Appeals faced the question squarely
when in 1937 the constitutionality of an 1830 statute was challenged.Y The
statute gave equity courts the power to enter deficiency decrees in mortgage
foreclosure actions,87 a freedom which probably had been denied them before
the statute. The majority of the court upheld the statute, noting that when
equity properly took jurisdiction of a matter it generally decided all issues
presented. Since the equity jurisdiction over foreclosures was clear, the former
New York law requiring a second suit to get a deficiency decree was a de-
viation from general equity principles which might be corrected by the legisla-
29. For description of the various remedies for fraud see PRossER, ToRTs 520-22 (2d
ed. 1955) ; SHULMAN & JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ToRTs 824-27 (2d ed, 1952).
The legal remedies included the action on the case for fraud and an action for the considera-
tion parted with (general assumpsit, etc.) after rescission at law. The equitable remedies in-
clude a suit for rescission and the constructive trust device.
30. 3 BLACKSTONE 434.
31. Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935) ; Prudential Life Ins. Co.
v. Saxe, 134 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den. 319 U.S. 745 (1943).
The history of the matter is traced in Abbot, Fraud as a Defence at Law in the Federal
Courts, 15 CoLum. L. REv. 489 (1915).
32. See supra note 21.
33. Lewis, Injunctions against Nuisances and the Rule Requiring the Plainliff to
Establish his Right at Law, 56, U. PA. L. REv. 289 (1908) ; Note, Trial by Jury in Suits to
Enjoin Nuisances, 25 CoLUm. L. REV. 641 (1925).
34. See Comment, 32 YALE L.J. 707, 709-10 (1923) ; cf. Lewis, supra note 33.
35. See note 27 supra.
36. This statute is dealt with and held constitutional in Jamaica Say. Bank v. M. S.




ture. The statute was enacted after the constitutional provision for a jury
trial was adopted, 38 but before the union of law and equity was completed. The
decision upholds a change in the strict historical position of jury trial and
therefore sanctions a construction of the constitution which will accommodate
such changes when they follow authentic historical patterns for change. The
reason for the change (avoidance of two suits) is one which no longer exists
under the Code. But it is submitted that the decision should justify a similar
change made today for reasons which have continuing vitality.
At no time in history was the line dividing equity from law altogether-or
even largely-the product of a rational choice between issues which were
better suited to court or to jury trial. There is little to suggest that the
chancellor's initial choice of a procedure borrowed from canon law reflected
a considered rejection of jury trial.30 Rather, the choice between law and
equity frequently was made upon considerations of other factors. For when
equity procedure took shape it differed from the procedure at law in several
important respects. Evidence in equity was produced largely by sworn plead-
ings and written depositions taken upon written interrogatories, rather than
38. "The trial by jury in all cases in which it has been heretofore used shall remain
inviolate forever.' N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 2. These words have "been part of the fundamental
law of the state since the adoption of the Constitution of 1821," Loughran, J., dissenting in
Jamaica Say. Bank v. M. S. Investing Co., 274 N.Y. 215, 224, 8 N.E2d 493, 496 (1937).
The majority-tookno issue with this statement.
39. Thus there is no mention of a desire or choice to reject jury trial in the standard ac-
counts of the origins of equity. See, e.g., 3 BLAcrsToNE 50-53, 434-55 (pointing to fact that
many early chancellors were churchmen) ; 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, ch. 2 (14th
ed. 1918) ; K.RLy, Ax MIsToPicAL SKET c OF THE EQUITABLE JuIsDICTION OF T E COURT
OF CHANCERY 81 (1890) (case in 1374 shows the subpoena and the examination of de-
fendant already in regular use by Council "having been borrowed perhaps by the Chancellors
and other Canonists who sat in it from the procedure of the Courts Christian where both
had long been established."), & ch. 5 (cases on common law side of chancery referred to
jury, but cases on equity side so referred only exceptionally). See generally, 1 HOLDS-
WORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw ch. 5 (7th ed. 1956); AfhrmAn, EQUrr 5 (2d ed.
1936) ; PLucKNErr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMoN LAW 163-65, 178-81, 675-84 (5th
ed. 1956); 1 PomERoY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE §§ 30-37 (5th ed. 1941); IVA.su, A
TREATISE ON IEQuITY ch. 2 (1930).
A recent author has, indeed, suggested that the early chancellors may have chosen non-
jury trial because much of their work was "unsuitable for resolution by the typically illiterate
jury." Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1181 (1961). There is,
however, no citation of authority for the statement and while the suggestion seems plausible
it apparently rests on speculation.
40. The equity procedure in the 18th century is described in 3 BLACESTONE 442-55. For
an account of the taking of evidence in an earlier case, see KERL, op. cit. supra note 39,
at 68-69. In Chapter 8 of the same work, Kerly describes in some detail the taking of evidence
during the period from Wolsey to the Commonwealth which, he says, was the practice
that in the main lasted down to the Chancery reforms of the 19th century.
In New York, the old method was to have testimony in equity cases taken before masters
and examiners in Chancery, a practice which proved cumbersome and expensive in prac-
tice. The Constitution of 1846, which paved the way for the Field Code, contained a pro-
vision that: "The testimony in equity cases shall be taken in like manner as in cases at law."
Art. VI, § 10. See NEW YoRx, REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PRocEEwINGS OF THE CON-
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by testimony taken orally and subject to oral cross-examination, all in the
presence of the trier of fact. At law the parties to an action were neither
competent nor compellable to testify,41 whereas in equity each party could
offer his own sworn statements and also "probe the conscience" of his ad-
versary by propounding written interrogatories, which had to be answered
under oath.42 The chancellor used specific remedies which were not available
to the law courts, and the chancellor could handle multiple parties and the
possibility of multiple suits in a way that the law courts had not developed. 4
The procedure of each tribunal had to be taken as a package, and each pro-
cedure had substantial limitations which the other did not share. In equity the
procedure was epistolary, included the statements of both parties, might pro-
vide for specific relief and handle multiple parties and suits, and involved no
jury. At law the procedure involved oral testimony and cross-examination at
a jury trial, relief in ren, and the unavailability of the testimony of either
party.
From the above it may be seen that even where the allocation of issues be-
tween the jurisdictions was based on rational considerations, it would often
be dictated by some factor other than jury trial. When the chancellor was
faced with a prickly question of credibility of witnesses, his rational desire for
the benefits of demeanor evidence could be satisfied only by sending the issue
to the law court with its jury. Where an accounting between business associates
was sought, if the inquiry was to have the benefit of the testimony of the
parties (the two witnesses who could shed the most-sometimes the only-
light on the matter), it would have to be conducted in equity, where the
chancellor would decide questions of fact without a jury. The same thing was
true where specific performance of a contract was appropriate rather than
damages for its breach, or when unnecessary multiplicity of suits was to be
prevented. To put it colloquially, jury trial (or court trial) was often merely
the tail of the dog under a system where you had to take the whole dog.
The extensions of equity jurisdiction noted above 4 4 were also motivated in
part by considerations having little or nothing to do with the merits or flaws
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1846 782-85. This is probably true today in all American juris-
dictions.
41. 2 WIGmoaa, EVIDENCE §§ 575-77 (3d ed. 1940).
42. 3 BLACKSTONE 442-51. The bill and answer might be supplemented by affidavits.
The bill itself contained not only statements of fact but interrogatories propounded to de-
fendant. 1 PomEnoY, EQuITY JURIsDICTIoN § 191 (5th ed. 1941). "The first answer was
... rarely deemed sufficient, and second, third, fourth and further answers might be ordered
on the Master's Certificate, the defendant paying... costs as ordered. . ." XIERLY, op. cit.
supra note 39, at 120.
43. 1 PO R-OY, EQUITY JURISDICTION §§ 37, 108-17, 243-75 (5th ed, 1941).
44. Text at notes 21-27 supra.
43. Levin, Equitable Clean-up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA. L.
REV. 320 (1951).
44. These struggles are recounted in the sources cited supra note 39. See, e.g,, ERnnL ,
op. cit. supra note 39, chs. 4, 7, 10; 1 HOLDSWoRTH, op. cit. supra note 39, at 459-65; WALSII,
op. cit. supra note 39, §§ 5, 6.
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of jury trial. They reflected rather the concern of equity to mitigate the hard-
ships of the dual system.45 An equity suitor who was relegated to his legal
remedy would always face the expense and delay of starting all over again;
and he might also risk loss of his legal rights through the running of a statute
of limitations or inability to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant.
In addition to these considerations, it is familiar learning that the alloca-
tion of a dispute to either law or equity was often made on the basis of con-
siderations relevant to the long political struggle between the King and Parlia-
ment in England. These considerations had little to do with the efficient ad-
ministration of justice.46 And while the jury occasionally became a symbol and
a bone of contention in this struggle,47 yet here, too, many factors other than
the mode of trial often dominated the allocation of subject matter.
It would be a mistake, of course, to suppose that chancellors were never con-
cerned with the jury trial problem in taking or refusing jurisdiction. One
reason often given for assuming equitable jurisdiction over an accounting was
the difficulty of the case for a jury.4S The issue of mutual mistake in written
instruments may well have been kept from juries out of fear that they might
be too ready to upset, on uncritical emotional grounds, the stability which
written instruments ought to represent.49 On the other hand, when equity
courts refused to try disputed questions of legal title in suits to enjoin tres-
passes, the appropriateness of trying such a dispute to a jury was often
stressedW
B. Modern Application of the Historical Test
Under a merged procedure, few if any of the differences between law and
equity continue to have any vitality, except the question of mode of trial. No
longer must an entire set of procedural incidents be taken as a package, either
legal or equitable. A single court is charged with applying the whole law of
45. Thus in Heath v. Rydley, Cro. Jac. 335, 79 Eng. Rep. 286 (K. B. 1614), the court
reasoned that after a common law judgment "the party ought to be quiet, and to submit
thereto. . ." rather than resort to Chancery, "for neither writ of error nor attaint can be
brought to reverse the decrees [of chancery] ; otherwise it is upon trials at the common law;
for all matters are there decided either by a jury of twelve men, against whom (if they err in
their verdict) an attaint lieth; or by the Judges, where if they err in their judgment, the
party aggrieved may bring his writ of error." The notion seems to be that the chancellor
should not use his extraordinary power to interfere with a composite, appealable judgment
representing to some extent the popular and parliamentary side.
The decision was put on statutory ground. See 27 Edw. III, c. 1 (1353) and Prohibition,
4 Hen. IV, c. 23 (1402) but the court sought to justify its reading of the statutes by the rea-
soning described above.
48. See, e.g., Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Cat. R. 1, 51-53 (N.Y. Ch. 1804); Bennett v.
United Lumber & Supply Co., 110 Conn. 536, 538, 148 A. 369 (1930) ; cf. SroR, EQurr
JURsPRUDENcE 425 (14th ed. 1918).
49. fcCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Proccdural Device for Control of Mhe
Jury, 41 Y.A.E LJ. 365 (1932) ; 9 WiGmoR, EvDENcE § 2426, at 86 (3d ed. 1940).
50. Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S.E. 164 (1902). Cf. Attorney General v. Cleaver,
18 Ves. 211, 217-18, 34 Eng. Rep. 297, 299 (Ch. 1811) ; New Castle v. Raney, 130 Pa. 546,
562 (1890) (both nuisance cases).
1963]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the land and drawing from it whatever is appropriate to any civil action. All
trials are conducted by oral examination of available witnesses in court. Parties
are competent and compellable to testify upon any issue. There is no reason,
apart from history, why sharply disputed issues of fact in an action seeking
specific performance of a contract should not be tried to a jury if that mode
of trial is thought preferable. And no other reason to keep a court from as-
signing a complicated building contract case for court trial if the issues are
deemed to be beyond the competence of the jury.
The considerations discussed above tend to show that the historical test of
jury trial right embodied in our constitutions is probably not well-adapted to
the merged or united procedures of the present day. It carries too much of
the deadwood of the past. A critical use of history may be an excellent guide
to present problems, but a critical use takes account of changes in conditions
as well as similarities. The historical constitutional test is with us, however,
and probably will remain so, because men are unlikely to agree on any basic
changes. If that is so, then the above considerations argue in favor of an
elastic construction of the historical test by the courts in order to accommodate
further shifts of the kind and along the lines of those which were continually
taking place in the very period of history to which the constitutions refer. And
if such shifts are to be countenanced at all, the courts should judge them on the
basis of considerations which have vitality in terms of modern judicial ad-
ministration and not in terms which had relevance only under the divided
procedure.
The arguments for a static historical test are (1) its greater protection of
the jury trial right from inroads by active courts which would restrict the
right; (2) the curb it would put upon equally active courts bent on enlarging
the scope of jury trials; and (3) its greater certainty. Since the value of
jury trial in civil cases today is a hotly disputed issue and since both the
constitutions and the codes embody a judgment that it should be neither ex-
panded (by any general procedural system) nor contracted at all, much can be
said for a static historical test.
It is submitted, nevertheless, that there should be some room for change
from a pattern made nearly two centuries ago and that the arguments against
excesses can be substantially met by confining the changes within the care-
fully circumscribed limits charted by the New York Court of Appeals.
II. THiE JURY TRIAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN A UNITED
OR MERGED PROCEDURE
A. The Choice of Mode of Trial at Common Law
The jury trial problem as we know it today is a product of the united pro-
cedure; it had no counterpart under the old system. To be sure, some problens
concerning jury trial were presented even before merger. We have seen how
the chancellor would sometimes decline to take jurisdiction for fear of tres-
passing on the right to a jury,5' and how he would at other times take jurisdic-
51. See note 50 supra.
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tion because of the unsuitability of jury trial.5 2 But once it was conceded or
determined that a case was in the proper court, the mode of trial to be had
followed nearly automatically. For trial of the issues made by the pleading, a
jury was all a law court had to offer. Except for a discretionary advisory jury,
court trial was all that equity would afford. This simplicity was purchased,
however, at the price of much hardship and waste by way of double actions to
get complete relief and frequent dismissals of meritorious claims brought to the
wrong forum.
Any true merger of law and equity avoids these hardships of the old system.
To do so it provides that all relief, legal and equitable, may be sought in a
single action ;53 moreover, it must be sought in a single action where it arises
out of a single transaction or occurrence.r5 Thus many a civil action of today
comprises more than any action could before the merger. When this aspect of
merger is coupled with a constitutional guaranty of jury trial geared to the
old system, and a decision not to extend the scope of jury trial, complex
problems arise.
B. The Provisions for Mode of Trial in Merged Systems
To meet the jury trial problem the original New York Code contains a
provision which was widely copied in other early codes. It read thus:
Whenever, in an action for the recovery of money only, or of specific
real or personal property, there shall be an issue of fact, it must be tried
by a jury, unless a jury trial be waived, as provided in section 221, or
a reference be ordered, as provided in sections 225 and 226.55
Another section of this Code, also widely copied, provided for waiver of
jury trial by written consent of the parties filed with the the clerk, by oral con-
sent in open court entered in the minutes, or by failure to appear at the trial.ro
52. See notes 48-49 supra.
53. This was the cornerstone of the original New York Code. See Nav Yoan, Fnsr
REPORT OF THE ColunssIoNERs ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGs 67-88 (1848) (hereinafter
cited as FIRST REPORT OF CoinnssIoNERs).
Accordingly, N.Y. Sess. Laws (1848), ch. 379, § 62 abolished "[t]he distinction between
actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits," and provided
for "but one form of action, for the enforcement or protection of private rights and the
redress or prevention of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action." See
N.Y. Civ. PRc. AcT § 8 (1920) ; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L R. § 103(a) (1962, eff. Sept. 1, 1963).
See CLAKx, CODE PLEADING § 15 (2d ed. 1947).
This objective is implemented under the federal rules by FED. R. Cv. P. 2, 8(e) (2).
54. Hennepin Paper Co. v. Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co., 153 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.
1946) ; Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902) ; Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y.
109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901) ; James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure,
45 YALE L.J. 1022,1026 n.29 (1936).
55. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 379, § 208 (1848). The present provision is not greatly different.
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 425 (1920) ; neither is the provision which will become effective on
September 1,1963. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. R. § 4101 (1962).
56. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 379, § 221 (1848). Cf. N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. ACT § 426 (1920);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. R. § 4102 (1962, eff. Sept. 1,1963).
As conservative as this provision seems to the modern eye, it was something of a novelty
when first proposed in 1848. Its authors were "inclined to think, that parties will frequently
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These provisions proved unsatisfactory; the former because it specified the
action as the unit to be dealt with rather than the component issues ;5 the
latter because it often failed to settle the question of jury trial until the time
of the trial and also because it required affirmative steps for waiver, so that
inertia or sloth might yield jury trial where there was indifference to the
question rather than any active desire for a jury by either party.
The defects in the waiver provision proved exceedingly disruptive of the
orderly administration of justice. Trial calendars cannot be efficiently ordered
if it is not known until the very time of trial which cases are going to require
a jury.58 Indeed, it was not perfectly clear in all states that a party waived
a jury by going to trial before the court alone without objection 9 (so that he
might both gamble on the outcome of the court trial, and object on appeal to
deprivation of his jury right if the trial judge found against him). Moreover,
the older type of provision put the weight of inertia on the side of the more
expensive and dilatory mode of trial. These defects have been felt most
keenly where trial dockets are crowded and delays-particularly in jury cases
-are great.60
Because of the disadvantages of the earlier provisions some of the later codes
(notably that of Connecticut) 61 and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 02
avail themselves of this permission." They mention several kinds of cases where they
thought the parties would prefer a court trial: cases where evidence is largely documentary
or the questions largely ones of law; cases respecting title to land, of insurance, or concern-
ing commercial paper, or requiring consideration of foreign law. They point out that in the
limited class of cases where the parties were theretofore free to choose the mode of trial,
court trial had been "the more commonly chosen" (the figures cited put the preference at
nearly 20 to 1). They end their note by this comment:
One of the most burthensome duties of the citizen, is the performance of jury service.
If that burthen can be lessened, by the plan proposed, without in any way infring-
ing upon the rights of parties, we shall regard it as a great benefit.
FIRST REORT OF CoMMIssIoNUs 189-90.
57. See text accompanying notes 110-13 in!ra.
58. See, e.g., Platt v. Havens, 119 Cal. 244, 51 Pac. 342 (1897) ; Farwell v. Murray,
104 Cal. 464, 38 Pac. 199 (1894), described in James, supra note 54, at 1045.
59. See, e.g., Shaw v. Kent, 11 Ind. 80 (1858). Cf. Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149,
118 N.E. 512 (1917).
60. The New York experience is illuminating. In 1920 the legislature declined to change
the original scheme for waiver. See note 56 supra. In 1927, however, it yielded to pressure
and amended the act to require affirmative jury trial claim in New York and Brom counties
only. N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 696 (1927). This provision was extended to all metropolitan
counties in 1929. See CLARx, CODE PLEADING § 17, p. 116 n.108 (2d ed. 1947). Further ex-
tensions (e.g., Westchester, Suffolk counties) occurred between that time and the adoption
of the new Civil Practice Law. The latter requires affirmative claim in all jury cases and
provides: "If no party shall demand a trial by jury as provided herein, the right to trial
by jury shall be deemed waived by all parties." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. R. § 4102(a) (1962, eft.
Sept. 1, 1963).
61. The present provision appears in CoNr. GEN. STAT. § 52-215 (1958). It was first
adopted in 1879, but has remained substantially unchanged except that the present statute
provides for a jury of six unless the demand, or court order, specifies a full jury of 12.
62. FED. R. C. P.38(d),39(b).
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have adopted a different type of provision to govern the mode of trial and the
matter of waiver of right to jury. The salient features of these later provisions
are these:
(1) They do not set up a self-contained test for matters triable to a
jury, but expressly adopt the constitutional test either by direct
reference or by a simple reference to history.
(2) They specify the issue rather than the entire action as the unit
to be dealt with in determining the right to jury trial, thus ex-
plicitly providing for the trial of some issues to the court and other
issues to a jury, all in the same civil action. 3
(3) They require an affirmative demand for jury trial at some pre-trial
stage in the action and provide for vaiver of jury trial in cases
where no such demand is made,04 thus isolating at a time well
before trial those cases where there is to be a jury trial or a
problem about jury trial.
Fundamentally, both the older and newer types of provision seek to embody
the historical test (for right to jury trial)which is embodied in the constitu-
tions. It is true that the early codes sought to give a self-contained definition
of actions triable to a jury but these definitions were probably meant, and have
generally been interpreted, to be simply declaratory of the common law. What
this means is that the architects of the united procedures took a neutralist
position with respect to jury trial. 5 Like the constitutions, they sought to pre-
serve it where it previously existed. But they did not intend their procedural
reform to extend jury trial any more than the framers of the constitutions in-
tended the guaranty of jury trial to extend its scope.
63. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
64. In Connecticut the demand is timely if made either within 30 days after the return
day or within 10 days after an issue of fact is joined. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-215 (1958).
Under the federal rules the demand must be served upon the other parties "at any time
after the commencement of the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the
last pleading directed to such issue." FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
65. See notes 71-73 infra and accompanying text. The architects of the original New
York Code, although they did not approve unqualifiedly of jury trial and hoped that their
provision for waiver would diminish its use (note 56 stpra), nevertheless did contemplate
some extension of jury trial, probably as a result of the jury trial provision which they pro-
posed (set forth in text, at note 55 supra). See FIRsT RE PT op CoinassioNuns 185 (com-
ment following proposed § 208 ends with following sentence: "We propose an extension of
the right of trial by jury to many cases, not within the constitutional provision.").
Judge Clark has suggested that this sentence may have referred to specific extensions
of jury trial by statutes other than the Code. CLARK, CODE PL.AnING § 16, at 99 n.60 (2d ed.
1947). But New York courts have construed the Code as in fact extending the jury trial
right. Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A.O. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146 N.E. 381 (1925).
The almost-if not quite-universal repudiation of these results outside of New York,
however [see James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YA.E
L.J. 1022, 1031-36 (1936) ; CLAR, CODE PL.EDING § 16, at 98-101 (2d ed. 1947)], and their
recent repudiation-in part at least-in New York (See notes 113a & 148 infra) argue
strongly that if this was the intent of the New York Commissioners on this point, it w-as
not widely shared by the framers of other codes. At any rate, any doubt which may be
generated by the original New York provision and its progeny are foreclosed by the clear
wording of provisions like those of Connecticut and the Federal Rules. See notes 61-62 mupra.
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The historical test, though widely accepted as the basis for solution, poses
certain problems. Some of them are purely practical; one goes much deeper.
On the practical level, it appears that history is sometimes equivocal. 0 More-
over even where history is dear, analogies drawn from the divided procedure
cannot be matched exactly with the situations that arise under a merged pro-
cedure,67 so that the precise application of history is hard or even impossible.
Probably because of these difficulties attempts have been made to reduce the
historical test to rules of thumb which will provide readier (but not essentially
different) solutions to many of the aspects of the jury trial problem. The
early code definitions represent one such attempt ;08 Professor Moore's basic-
nature-of-the-issue test 19 currently represents another.
The deeper difficulty with the historical test is that it tends to foreclose re-
newed and continuing judicial inquiry into the suitability of different types of
issues for jury trial in a modern context. To a certain extent-as we have seen
-the constitutions themselves foreclose such inquiry. And perhaps it may be
assumed that the distinction between law and equity-though it did not to
any great extent arise from this consideration-came in time to reflect, at
least in part, the pragmatic judgment by wise and experienced men of what
matters were suitable for jury trial. Nevertheless, as we have seen,10 in many
cases a chancellor came to try issues which would customarily be for a jury
for reasons which made perfectly good sense under the limitations of a divided
procedure but have nothing to do with suitability of jury trial and which have
no continuing vitality under a united procedure. Hence, some changes would
seem to be desirable.
For the most part, any argument along this line must be addressed to those
bodies entrusted with the power to amend constitutions, or to legislatures,
or to courts in their rule-making (rather than their adjudicative) capacity. For
good or evil, both the constitutions and the charters of the merged procedure
embody the policy judgment, quite deliberately made, to leave the extent of
jury trial about where history had come to place it. It may well be doubted
whether it lies within the proper sphere of the judicial process to nullify that
judgment, although there should be some room for these considerations in
interpreting statutes and rules (as well as constitutions) and in resolving
doubtful lessons of history.
C. The Types of Situations in Which Jury Trial Problem is Presented
1. Civil actions which are counterparts of former law actions or cquity suits
Many suits today are, from summons to judgment, no more than the coun-
terpart of a former action at law. The typical personal injury suit furnishes a
66. See, e.g., the majority and dissenting opinions in Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46
(2d Cir. 1961) ; Swanson v. Alworth, 168 Minn. 84, 209 N.W. 907 (1926). C1. City of
Syracuse v. Hogan, 234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923) ; C.E.C., Comment, 32 YALE L.J.
707 (1923).
67. See notes 116-30 infra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 55 & 65 supra and accompanying text.
69. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcricE 38.16 (2d ed. 1951).
70. See, e.g., text atnotes 39-47 supra.
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ready example. Other suits present throughout only such facts and claims as
would clearly have been cognizable in equity. A suit to foreclose a mortgage
is a good illustration.71 In cases like these there is no greater jury problem to-
day than there was under a divided procedure. Such right exists where it
did before, and not otherwise.
It is true that statutes of the early code type might have given trouble even
in these simple cases. A suit for an accounting between partners could quite
literally be described as one"for the recovery of money only." A bill for
specific performance of a contract to convey realty had as its ultimate objective
nothing more or less than "the recovery... of specific real property." And
so it was with all cases where plaintiff claimed money or property on the
ground of some right, title, or interest which only equity would recognize.
But, with virtual uniformity, these statutes were not construed in this literal
manner; rather they were interpreted in the light of history. Such a ".. pro-
vision is no broader than the provision of the Constitution." 2 In all the situa-
tions described in this paragraph, therefore, jury trial was denied.73
The problems peculiar to a united procedure are presented by that peculiar
product of union, the civil action that contains more in the way of claims or
defenses than any suit could have contained in the old days. The case may be
one where a plaintiff injects both legal and equitable claims, or where an
equitable defense or counterclaim is interposed to an action presenting only
legal issues, or vice versa. And there may be combinations of these situations
in a single action.
2. Civil actions where plaintiff injects both legal and equitable claims
a. Historical patterns
There were several different situations under the former procedure where a
suitor needed both equitable and legal relief to get complete redress for his
injury. There were other types of situations where the suitor had a choice of
remedies. There were still others where he had only one remedy but mistakenly
71. At least where no deficiency decree is sought. See notes 36-37 mipra and accompany-
ing text.
72. Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, 130 Minn. 252, 254, 153 N.V. 527, 528
(1915).
73. Accounting: United Coal Co. v. Canon City Coal Co., 24 Colo. 116, 48 Pac. 1045
(1897) ; Morton Brick & Tile Co. v. Sodergren, supra note 72; Ely v. Coontz, 167 Mo.
371, 67 S.W. 299 (1902).
Specific performance (realty): Davis v. Judson, 159 Cal. 121, 113 Pac. 147 (1910) ; cf.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 59 Mo. 232 (1875).
Claims to money or property on equitable grounds: Cree v. Lewis, 49 Colo. 186, 189,
112 Pac. 326 (1910) ("True, plaintiff demanded and was given a money judgment, but this
relief depended upon the establishment of a trust.") ; Conran v. Sellew, 28 Mo. 320, 322
(1859) ("These provisions manifestly makes a distinction between suits which were formerly
recognized as actions at law, and bills in equity; and the mode of trial in a given case under
the present code may generally be determined by ascertaining whether under the old
system it would be cognizable at law or in equity.")
See also CLARKx, CODE PLEADING § 16, at 99-101.
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pursued the other. The differences among these were important because differ-
ent patterns of trial and trial sequence were applied.
In one class of cases a suitor had to resort to equity first to get any relief,
or to get full relief. Where an instrument to which A and B were parties did
not, as it was written, support any legal claim by A and A also claimed that
the writing failed by mutual mistake to embody the actual agreement of the
parties, which would support A's legal claim if it had been embodied in the
instrument, then A could get nowhere in a court of law unless and until
equity decreed a reformation of the instrument. This was not the kind of mis-
take which the common law would remedy; it would simply enforce the in-
strument as written. 4 If the chancellor found mutual mistake, he would not
only decree reformation but would also settle any remaining issues pertinent
to A's right to relief under the instrument as reformed and award relief 7
At least the chancellor would do all that if A asked him to.70 If the chancellor
found no mutual mistake he would dismiss the bill, leaving the parties to any
remedy they might have at law77 In the illustration put, that would be none;
but there were cases where either the equity plaintiff, A, or his adversary, B,
would have some legal remedy under the instrument as written. In this type of
case if B sued A at law under the instrument as written, the chancellor would
enjoin the prosecution of this legal action until the question of mutual mistake
had been determined.78
Let us call this pattern of behavior Pattern I. In it the equitable issue would
always be tried first and tried without a jury.79 Neither of the parties had a
choice about this nor did the equity court have any real discretion since a
temporary injunction against prosecution of the law action would issue as a
matter of course.80 Moreover, the equitable issue (mutual mistake) was one
74. Compare Capital City Bank v. Hilson, 59 Fla. 215, 51 So. 853 (1910) (contract as
written supports no legal judgment on facts) with Capital City Bank v. Hilson, 64 Fla. 206,
60 So. 189 (1912) (complaint held to show basis for reformation of same contract and for
recovery of damages). Compare also Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Hellerick, 20 Ky. L. Rep,
1703, 49 S.W. 1066 (1899) (no recovery where burned building not within policy descrip-
tion) with Hillerich v. Franklin Ins. Co., 111 Ky. 255, 63 S.W. 592 (1901) (amendment
presenting basis for reforming same policy held improperly denied).
75. Kelly v. Galbraith, 186 Ill. 593, 58 N.E. 431 (1900) ; Keith v. Henkleman, 173 I1.
137, 50 N.E. 692 (1898) ; Capital City Bank v. Hilson, 64 Fla. 206, 60 So. 189 (1912) ;
Annot., 66 A.L.R. 763, 777-87 (1930) ; 1 POMEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 237c (5th cd.
1941).
76. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
77. 1 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note 75, § 237d.
78. See, e.g., Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U.S. 235, 242-43 (1922); cI.
Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935) ; American Cyanamid Co. v. Wil-
son & Toomer Fertilizer Co., 62 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1933).
79. Unless, of course, the defendant at law was unaware of the pendency of the law
suit, or of his own equity, or for some other reason failed to resort to equity before judgment
in the action at law. It was the issuance of injunctions in such situations that precipitated the
Coke-Ellsmere struggle and finally established the ascendancy of equity.
80. Young v. Reynolds, 4 Md. 375 (1853) ; Hibbard v. Eastman, 47 N.H. 507 (1867) ; 1




which law courts did not recognize. Finally, if the equitable issue vas decided
in favor of A, there would be no second suit and thus no jury trial of any is-
sue.
81
At the opposite pole was a class of cases in which equity refused to give re-
lief unless and until a preliminary legal issue had been determined at law by
a jury, yet where equitable relief was needed for plaintiff's complete protec-
tion. Where A claimed that B's structure encroached on A's land but B also
claimed title to the land under the structure, equity would not order the struc-
ture removed until the title dispute was settled at law.m If A won the law
action, equity would order B to remove the structure if it was impractical for
the sheriff to remove it under a writ of execution.83 Again, where A claimed
that B owed him a legal debt and wished to reach B's equitable assets, or
property conveyed by B to C to defraud B's creditors, equity would grant no
relief if B disputed the debt until A had reduced his debt claim to a judgment
at law 4. Then, at least if execution could not be satisfied, equitable relief
would be forthcoming on a proper showing.8 5
Let us call this pattern of behavior Pattern II. In it, equity would refuse to
try the legal issue; and the legal issue would always be tried first.8 0 If the trial
was won by A, he still would often need a second suit in equity to get complete
relief. Thus there would be two trials, one to a jury, and one to a court alone
on those issues which pertained to the propriety of equitable relief. Again,
neither party had any choice in the matter, and the courts had no discretion.
Between these two fairly clear-cut patterns lay a host of others in many of
which either kind of relief depended on the resolution of an issue which either
tribunal would try (with its own mode of trial). Thus B's violation of A's
statutory right (e.g., to a patent or copyright) might entitle A to an injunc-
tion, to compensatory damages, and to a penalty. The right to any relief would
turn on whether B violated the statute. A might get a determination of that
issue without a jury in an equity suit, seeking an injunction and perhaps com-
pensatory damages as incidential to an injunction.8 T Or he might get such de-
81. See note 75 supra. But see text at note 76 supra.
82. See cases cited note 50 supra.
83. Ibid.
84. See e.g., Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688, 690-91 (1879) ; Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491, 497 (1923) ; Southard v. Benner, 72 N.Y. 424,426 (1878>; American
Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783 (1929) (dealing with change wrought by
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and also prior law) ; 5 PomRzoy, Eourrn Junxs-
PRUDENCE §§ 2294-2318 (871-895) (particularly § 2305 (882)) (4th ed. 1919) (this part,
which was originally J. N. Pomeroy, Jr.'s EQuITrALE Rmmams, does not appear in the
5th edition of Pommaoy, EQurrABLE J~USPRUDENCE).
85. Ibid.
86. The rules themselves were not without exceptions which warranted equitable relief
without first establishing the legal right at law, as the cases cited in notes 50 & 84 show.
Unless, however, the case could be brought under one of these exceptions the legal issue
would always be tried first.
87. Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899) ; Marsh v. Seymour, 97 U.S. 348 (1877) ; see
Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133-4 (1881) ; 35 U.S.C.A. § 283 note 197.
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termination in an action at law for damages or for the penalty.88 Since equity
refused to enforce a penalty 8 9 and the law would not give an injunction, two
suits would be required for complete relief. A had the choice which to bring
first. And the first determination of the common issue (violation vcl non)
would bind the parties in the second action.90 The plaintiff then had the power
to choose the mode of trial of the common issue, and he could so exercise it
as to leave no room for judicial discretion.
If the statute did not provide for a penalty, A might be able to get complete
relief in a suit in equity.9 1 But he would also have the option to sue for dam-
ages at law and for an injunction in equity separately, in whichever order
he chose. So here again A could control the mode of trial of the common issue,
without leaving room for judicial discretion.
In another class of cases A also had a choice, but it was a more limited one.
Breach of certain kinds of contracts (e.g., to convey land) would entitle the
injured party to either specific performance 92 (with incidental damages for
delay of performance, and the like) or to damages for breach 93 (measured on
the assumption that the contract would not be performed). Here A could in
no case get both forms of relief-he bad to elect one or the other.0 4 His elec-
tion would govern the mode of trial of issues, such as making 06 of the contract,
performance of conditions precedent, breach,98 and the like, which would be
presented in a claim for either kind of relief.
88. Bereslavsky v. Caffey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Brucknan v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d
730 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Berlin v. Club 100, Inc., 12 F.R.D. 129 (D. Mass. 1951) ; Pallant v.
Sinatra, 7 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1945); Bellavance v. Plastic-Craft Novelty Co., 30 F.
Supp. 37, 38-39 (D. Mass. 1939), Davies v. Allied Industrial Prod., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 109
(N.D. Ill. 1951). But cf. Chappell & Co. v. Palermo Cafe, Inc., 146 F. Supp, 867 (D. Mass.
1956). The statutory provision for an "action on the case" for damages for patent infringe-
ment was repealed in 1948. 62 Stat. 992, 35 U.S.C.A. App. II § 67. Under the amendment
the parties are entitled to jury trial of the issues raised by a claim for damages, even where It
is coupled with a claim for injunction. National Dryer Mfg. Co. v. Dryer Co. of Am., 130 F.
Supp. 912 (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; Inland Steel Prod. Co. v. MPH Mfg. Co., 25 F.R.D. 238, 245-46
(N.D. Ill. 1959).
89. Decorative Stone Co. v. Building Trades Council, 23 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1928).
90. Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148 (1899) ; Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F2d ,730 (9th Cir.
1946) ; ef. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
91. See note 87 upra.
92. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACrS ch. 63 (1951).
93. Id. § 990 and, generally, chs. 55-60.
94. Rushing v. Mayfield Co., 62 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1932), ert. denied, 289 U.S. 750
(1933) ; cf. 5 CoRmmI CoNTA CTs § 1222 (1951).
95. Rash v. Peoples Deposit Bank & Trust Co., 192 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Canister
Co. v. Leahy, 182 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1950) ; Mahon v. Bennett, 81 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Mo.
1948) ; Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1940) ; Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19,
257 Pac. 1046 (1927) ; Morris, Jury Trial under the Federal Fusion of Law and Equity,
20 TEx. L. Ray. 427,428 (1942).
96. See, e.g., Altoona Electrical, Eng'r. & Supply Co. v. Kittanning & F. C. St. Ry.,
126 Fed. 559, 561 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1903) (substantial performance found by court on "a great
conflict between the witnesses." Id. at 562.).
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In the case just put, if A initially chose equitable relief, the chancellor might
find that specific performance was impossible or unsuitable even where there
might have been a breach of contract. Where the ground of equitable relief
failed in this manner, the court would usually dismiss the suit for want of
"equity jurisdiction," 97 leaving A free to pursue legal relief in a law court with
its jury. The chancellor would not, however, always dismiss a case when
specific performance was denied. In Denton v. Stewart, s defendant trans-
ferred the subject matter of the contract (a leasehold) to an innocent pur-
chaser after the equity suit was begun. This was held to frustrate the grant-
ing of specific performance; but to save plaintiff from the hardship of a second
action, the chancellor determined the issues and awarded damages. This
granting of substituted legal relief in equity was exceptional in late eighteenth
century England and may not have extended beyond the case of impossibility
arising after suit.9 The notion has enjoyed considerable growth since then,100
however, and has even been applied occasionally where specific performance
was denied because the contract was unconscionable by equitable standards.101
b. Modern patterns
The application to the current scene of Patterns I and II has not given much
trouble. There is not, and should not be, in these cases any talk of the court's
discretion in directing the order of trial of the issues. If any fidelity to history
whatever is observed, the equitable issue will be tried first in Pattern 1,102 the
legal issue in Pattern 11.103 In Pattern I, history is reinforced by common sense.
If there is a question whether an instrument should be reformed, that question
must necessarily be settled before an intelligent inquiry may be made into the
parties' rights under the alleged agreement.
Possible difficulties in the application of Pattern I may be presented by:
(a) a question whether an issue once exclusively equitable has worked
over into law. °4
(b) a question whether plaintiff, if he is entitled to equitable relief, is
also entitled to jury trial of residual legal issues. It is commonly
assumed that he would not be, since equity, if it took initial jurisdic-
tion, would settle all issues in the controversy as incidental to thatjurisdiction. 05 But this overlooks the fact that equity would do
this, historically, only if plaintiff requested it.100
97. Todd v. Gee, 17 Ves. Jr. 273, 34 Eng. Rep. 106 (Ch. 1810) ; Marks v. Gates, 154
Fed. 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1907) ; Flattau v. Logan, 72 N.J. Eq. 338, 65 At. 714 (1907).
98. 1 Cox Ch. 258,29 Eng. Rep. 1156 (Ch. 1786).
99. See Todd v. Gee, note 97 supra; Milkman v. Ordwvay, 106 Mass. 232, 253 et seq
(1870); Levin, Equitable Clean-Up and the Jury: A Suggested Orientation, 100 U. PA.
L. R. 320, 333-4 (1951).
100. See note 27 supra and accompanying te.\t
101. Gabrielson v. Hogan, 298 Fed. 22 (8th Cir. 1924) ; cf. Morgan v. Dibble, 43 Cal.
App. 116,184 Pac. 704 (1919) ; see Levin, op. cit. supra note 99, at 339.
102. See notes 75-79 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 82-86supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 31 supra.
105. See notes 23 and 24 supra.
106. See note 22 supra. In Austin v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co, 285 S.V. 1015 (Mo. App.
1926), a plaintiff was given this option without any discussion of historical antecedents.
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(c) a question whether, if equitable relief is denied, either party would
have a right to jury trial of any issues presented by the instrument
as written. This he should have,107 unless the case is treated as
falling within a latter-day extension of substituted legal relief in
equity, 08 or unless the right is waived.
(d) a question of waiver of jury trial by failure to claim it as prescribed
by statute or court rule. If there is such a waiver in the pleading
stage, it should not be relieved by later failure of the equitable
claim if that failure-and the consequent emergence of legal issues--
was foreseeable to the party now claiming a jury at the time of
waiver.109
(e) a question whether plaintiff may waive any jury trial right he
may have because he has joined claims for legal and equitable re-
lief. In New York such joinder has been consistently held to consti-
tute such a waiver." 0 This rule results from an unfortunate con-
struction put upon the early jury trial statute. Since plaintiff has
included an equitable claim, the "action" is no longer one within
the statutory definition "'-it is too big to fit within the statu-
tory pigeon-hole, so to speak. By making it so, plaintiff has there-
by waived his jury right. Such a result is seldom reached else-
where even under similar statutory provisions ;112 it can scarcely be
reached under the Federal Rules and their counterparts.'1 It has
been repudiated, at least in part, in the new Civil Practice Law.1a
(f) a question whether Pattern I, and indeed much of former equity
jurisdiction, has been abolished as a guide in solving the jury trial
problem by the creation of the declaratory judgment remedy. This
question has perhaps been raised by recent language of the United
States Supreme Court." 4
107. Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Burger, 27 F. Supp. 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Park v.
Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279,285, 60 Pac. 945, 946 (1900).
108. See notes 26, 27, 100 and 101 mipra.
109. Moore v. United States, 196 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkial,
147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Indianapolis Northern Traction Co. v. Brennan, 174 Ind. 1,
90 N.E. 65 (1909).
110. Cogswell v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 105 N.Y. 319, 11 N.E. 518 (1887) ; Di-
Menna v. Cooper & Evans Co., 220 N.Y. 391, 115 N.E. 993 (1917).
111. See note 55 .supra.
112. Moore v. San Vicente Lumber Co., 175 Cal. 212, 165 Pac. 687 (1917) ; fughes v.
Dunlap, 91 Cal. 385, 27 Pac. 642 (1891); Austin v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 285 S.W.
1015 (Mo. App. 1926).
113. Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Bruckman v. Hollzer, 152 F.2d 730
(9th Cir. 1946) ; Roy v. Moore, 85 Conn. 159, 82 Atl. 233 (1912).
113a. N.Y. Civ. PRuc. L. R. § 4102(c) (1962) provides in part: "A party shall not be
deemed to have waived the right to trial by jury of the issues of fact arising upon a claim,
by joining it with another claim with respect to which there is no right to trial by jury and
which is based upon a separate transactioi .... 1" It is doubtful whether the claims hi
Cogswell and Di Menna, sumra note 110, should be regarded as "based upon separate
transaction [s]."




Possible difficulties in the application of Pattern II may be presented by:
(a) a question whether an issue once exclusively legal has worked over
into equity. Such instances have been noted above."n
(b) a question whether plaintiff waives his historical (and constitu-
tional) jury trial right by joining legal and equitable claims. This
is the third question we noted in discussing Pattern I.
In the third group of cases discussed in the last section (which is too hetro-
geneous to be called a pattern) there is a common issue, or set of issues, which
is determinative of both forms of relief and which either law or equity would
try under some circumstances. Here again pre-merger patterns of judicial be-
havior are helpful in determining the mode of trial of the common issue.
In cases such as patent or copyright infringement, where plaintiff is entitled
to cumulate legal and equitable remedies, he had an option as to the mode of
trial which excluded any option by defendant or any discretion by the court.
Plaintiff exercised this option by seeking his remedies in separate suits, and
bringing them in the order he chose. Today under merger, plaintiff must seek
in a single suit all relief arising out of a single group of operative facts ;110 thus
the traditional manner of exercising his option is no longer available. But it
would be inconsistent with the preservation of his jury right, embodied in
both the constitutions and the charters of the merged procedures, to take
away the substance of the option. The problem is simply one of finding a
substitute method of exercising it which is consistent with the other objectives
of merger. It has been suggested that this method may be the drafting of the
complaint in separate counts for the legal and equitable relief. 1 7 But this seems
to put undue stress on form.118 The best solution, it is submitted, is to let
plaintiff express his choice of jury trial by simply claiming it in the way pro-
vided by statute or rule.
In either event the plaintiff would be given his jury option freed from the
old burden of having to bring two actions to secure it. It may be objected that
plaintiff would thus get an undeserved windfall. But double litigation was a
burden on defendants and on society as well, and no great harm will result
from freeing all parties from it and at the same time preserving plaintiff's jury
right.
The defendant had no choice of mode of trial in the situation under dis-
cusion. The only justification for giving him any choice today would be a
desire to extend, rather than merely preserve, his jury trial right. Nevertheless
a federal court of appeals has held that a defendant is entitled to jury trial of
the common issue in such a case ;119 the Supreme Court has recently cited this
decision, apparently with approval. 20 Both these cases disapproved earlier
115. See notes 20-27 supra and accompanying text.
116. Seenote54supra.
117. See Russell v. Laurel Music Corp., 104 F. Supp. 815, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
118. Cf. McCoid, Right to Jtry Trial in the Federal Courts, 45 IoWA L. REv. 726,
728-31 (1960).
119. Leimer v. Woods, 196 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1952).
120. Beacdn Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959).
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decisions which left the mode of trial to the trial court's discretion,121 a ruling
which is equally indefensible historically and could result in curtailing the
plaintiff's constitutional right (as well as in extending the defendant's).
The most troublesome problems in cases where a plaintiff injects both legal
and equitable claims into a civil action are found in the specific performance
situations. Fomerly, as we saw, plaintiff could have only one of the remedies
and he had to pursue it in the appropriate forum. He could not pursue them
alternatively in a single suit.122 And the dismissal of the equity suit because
specific performance was inappropriate would not bar a later action at law
for damages. 123 The merged procedure has changed some of this. Plaintiff may
still have only one of the remedies, 24 but he both may 125 and must 120 pursue
all of his remedies (arising from a single breach of contract) in a single action,
and he may do so alternatively (exercising the necessary choice between the
remedies after trial).127 Further, the court is empowered and directed in most
situations to award appropriate relief even where it has not been claimed in
the-complaint. s28 Question then arises as to jury trial right on common dis-
positive issues (e.g., contract vel non, etc.) in the single civil action which
plaintiff may bring, wherein he expressly pursues both remedies in the alterna-
tive or wherein the court may find appropriate and award a remedy not ex-
pressly demanded.
One suggestion is to let plaintiff's right be governed by plaintiff's preference
as to the kind of relief. Professor Moore would apply a rule of thumb for de-
termining this preference: equitable relief is deemed preferred if expressly
claimed.129 Professor Morris has tried to refine the test.8 0 The former seems
121. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937) ; Orenstein v. U.S., 191
F.2d 184, 190 (1st Cir. 1951). See also Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir.
1952).
122. Rushing v. Mayfield Co., 62 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S, 750
(1933).
123. Logan v. Flattan, 73 N.J. Eq. 222, 67 Atl. 1007 (1907) (after dismiqsing bill for'
specific performance, equity will not enjoin action at law) ; cf. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PE oM0
ANCE OF CONTRACTS § 475 (3d ed. 1926).
124. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1222 (1951) (a party "should not be allowed to enforce
and receive specific performance and at the same time get judgment for damages for a total
breach.").
125. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego Flume Co., 108 Cal. 549, 41 Pac. 495 (1895)
Sternberger v. McGovern, 56 N.Y. 12 (1874); cf. POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 01)
CONTRACTS § 480 (3d ed. 1926).
126. See note 54 supra.
127. FED. R. CIrv. P. 8(a) (3) ; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 8.18 (2d ed, 1948, Supp.
1962) ; cf. Morris, Jury Trial under the Federal Fusion of Lazo and Equity, 20 TEx. L.
REv. 427,430-33 (1942).
128. FED. R. Crv. P. 54(c); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 479; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. R. §
3017(a) (1962).
129. 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 38.21 (2d ed. 1951, Supp. 1962). Cf. Fraser v. Geist,
1, F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Pa. 1940).
130. Morris would require a plaintiff who claims damages and specific performance al-
ternatively to state his preference when jury trial is demanded. If he prefers damages, a
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unduly restrictive of plaintiff's jury right; the latter unduly difficult to ad-
minister.
As for defendant's right to a jury, it may come into play if the ground for
equitable relief fails or if plaintiff (being entitled to either relief) elects after
trial to take damages. The serious questions are: (a) whether the case would
have been one for substituted legal relief in equity and, if not, (b) whether
defendant will be allowed to exercise his jury trial right after the failure of
equitable grounds or after plaintiff's election of damages.
If the chancellor would have given substituted legal relief at the time re-
ferred to in the constitutional guaranty of jury trial, then defendant has no
right to a jury. But we have noted an American tendency to expand the con-
cept beyond that obtaining in England in 1791.131 This tendency raises the
question, discussed, above, 3 2 of the extent to which the constitutional guaranty
allows for flexible growth. Further, it should be noted that virtually the only
significance of the doctrine of substituted legal relief in a merged procedure is
its effect in curtailing jury trial. There should then be no justification for
expanding the notion of substituted legal relief in equity after merger, as some
American courts have done, except a desire to curtail jury trial, which is one of
the very things the architects of merger did not intend to have their reformed
procedure bring about.
It is true that if jury demands made after court trial are honored, this will
disrupt the administration of justice and let a litigant gamble on the outcome
of the first trial while being assured of a second if the first goes against him.
But the cure for these evils is not to be found in the questionable extension of
an archaic doctrine. Rather it is to be found in the waiver provisions expressly
embodied in modem merged procedures. These, it is submitted, provide a
reasonable solution for most of the problems presented by the specific perform-
ance situation, as well as by other situations where there is a failure of grounds
for equitable relief but it appears that plaintiff may be entitled to legal relief.
A jury must generally be claimed at a fairly early pre-trial stage, and it is
waived if not so claimed. 33 The solution proposed here would involve the
following rulings, in combination:
(a) A ruling that waiver of jury trial under statute or rule will not
be relieved against because of the emergence of legal claims based
on facts which were pleaded at the time of the waiver. In the
usual case plaintiff claims specific performance of a contract which
jury will be called at the start of the trial (and later dismissed if the damage theory be-
comes inadequate on some "purely legal" ground). If plaintiff prefers specific performance
and wants jury trial only if his right to specific performance fails on "purely equitable"
grounds, the judge should require him to state the fears which prompted the alternative
claim. "On the basis of such an explanation, the judge can marshal the trial so that equities
alone are dealt with first. The jury need not be called until the plaintiff's fears materialize."
Morris, op. cit. supra note 127, at 432, 433.
131. See notes 27, 100 & 101 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 36 & 50 supra and accompanying text.
133. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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he claims was breached; defendant denies the contract, or the breach
or both and claims specific performance is inappropriate anyhow. In
this situation it is perfectly foreseeable to defendant that if the court
should agree with his own claim about the inappropriateness of
specific performance, the pleaded facts present a legal issue. Armed
with this chance for foresight, defendant should not be allowed to
withhold his jury claim without waiver.184
(b) As a corollary of this ruling, a court would deny a timely jury claim
in such a case at peril of reversal if the case turned out so as to
vindicate the claim. This might be either a plaintiff's jury claim(wherever he has not effectively renounced his legal remedy) or a
defendant's claim under the circumstances described in the previous
paragraph.
(c) This will mean that where a jury claim is made the court will often
have a jury in attendance at the trial against the possibility that it
may be needed. In this way it can assure jury determination of the
potential legal issues and its own determination of equitable is-
sues.
1 3 5
If this procedure is followed it will mean that in some cases a jury will sit
through a whole trial and then have no function to perform (e.g., where the
court finds the common issues for plaintiff and awards specific performance).
Having a jury "to dance attendance"''1 6 may be wasteful. On the other hand,
the expense of their attendance may be regarded as an insurance premium
against the cost of retrials when matters turn out the other way; and the dis-
appointed suitor has much to gain and little to lose by demanding a new
trial before a jury. The procedure suggested above will not be adequate to
handle the rare case where the emergence of legal claims could not reasonably
be anticipated at the time provided for claiming jury trial. Bereslavsky v.
Caffey 137 was treated as presenting such a situation. The court held that where
plaintiff's claim for equitable relief failed for reasons arising after suit and be-
yond his control, he was entitled to claim a jury after amending his complaint
to omit the equitable claim. No doubt defendant would have the same right.
134. Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1945) ; cf. Garland v. Garland,
165 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Scholl v. Scholl, 152 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1945) ; note 109
mupra.
This is essentially the same solution as that suggested in 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
1f 38.18 (2d ed. 1951).
135. In Fraser v. Geist, 1 F.R.D. 267, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1940), Judge Kalodner said it
was "regrettable that Rule 39 as presently phrased.. ." precluded the solution suggested in
the text, because (he believed) that rule "makes it incumbent upon the court to decide from
the pleadings and prior to trial whether or not the action is one at lav or in equity."
Other courts have found no such inhibition in Rule 39. See, e.g., Hargrove v. American
Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Ford v. C. E. Wilson & Co., 30 F. Supp. 163
(D. Conn. 1939). See also CLARx, CODE PLEADING 106, 107 (2d ed. 1947); 5 MooRE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 38.18 n.5 (2d ed. 1951) (the position taken in Fraser v. Geist "is not
sound.").
136. Henry VIII, Act V, Sc. 2, 1.30.
137. 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947) ; cf. Bereslavsky v. Kloeb,
162 F.2d 816 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
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This seems a sensible solution where there was originally no basis for a jury
claim. But that was not the case in Bereslavsky.138
3. Civil action involving equitable defense to a legal claim
a. Historical pattern
Certain matters, cognizable in equity, would defeat a legal claim but were
not recognized at law and could not, therefore, be successfully pleaded in an ac-
tion at law.139 If A, the obligor on a specialty, claimed that he was induced by
fraud to execute it in favor of B, he could not interpose that fraud in B's legal
action on the specialty. 140 To get relief, A would have to go into equity and
seek cancellation of the specialty for the fraud. Equity would then enjoin the
prosecution of the law suit temporarily until the question of fraud was deter-
mined. If the chancellor found fraud, he would decree cancellation of the
specialty and make permanent the injunction against B's prosecution of the
law action.141 Thus there would be no jury trial of any issue. The equitable is-
sue would be tried first and dispose of the whole case, or where there were
residual legal issues (as where the instrument was reformed rather than can-
celled), equity would dispose of them as incidental to the equitable relief.142
It will be noted that the equitable relief, though always affirmative in form
(cancellation, rescission, etc.) in most cases had only the effect of defeating the
law action.143 If, on the other hand, the chancellor found no fraud, he would
dismiss the equity suit, dissolve the temporary injunction, and leave the parties
to their claims and defenses in the legal action. This pattern will be recognized
as being essentially a variant of Pattern I, described above.144
One thing more should be noted before we leave history. Many matters
which were cognizable only in equity in remote times came to be recognized
as defenses by courts of law-worked over into law as we say-in the course of
time. 145 After this process had become complete, equity would typically refuse
to enjoin the law action and grant relief, stating that the remedy at law was
adequate. 46 The equity plaintiff in any illustration could plead the matter as a
defense in the law action.
138. Since the plaintiff originally claimed both legal and equitable relief, he should,
at his option, have been given a jury trial upon demand. See text accompanying notes 117-18
supra. Since he did not claim it at that time, he should have been held to have waived it.
See text accompanying note 109 supra. See also CLARK, CASES ON MODERN PLEADING
596-97 (1952).
139. See the exposition in Cook, Equitable Defenses, 32 YAX. L.J. 645 (1923); cf.
Abbott, Fraud as a Defence at Law in the Federal Courts, 15 CoLum. L. Rxv. 489 (1915);
Hinton, Equitable Defenses under Modern Codes, 18 Mica. L. Rzv. 717 (1920).
140. George v. Tate, 102 U.S. 564, 570-1 (1880) ; Franchot v. Leach, 5 Cow. 506 (N.Y.
Super. Ct., 1825) ; Belden v. Davies, 2 Hal 433 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1829) ; Ames, Specially
Contracts and Equitable Defences, 9 HARv. L. REv. 49,51 (1895).
141. See Cook, supra note 139, at 649-50.
142. See note 24 sumra and accompanying text.
143. See Cook, supra note 139, at 650.
144. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
145. Ames, supra note 140; Abbott, supra note 139; Hinton, supra note 139, at 721-23.
146. Cable v. United States Life Ins. Co., 191 U.S. 288 (1903) ; Abbott, sipra note 139.
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b. Modern patterns
The prevailing pattern in merged procedures faithfully follows the historical
pattern except that all steps occur in a single civil action and there is no in-
junction. When B sues A upon the legal claim, A affirmatively pleads in that
action the matter that would have been the subject of a separate suit in equity
before the merger. What was accomplished by the temporary injunction tinder
the old procedure is done under the new by a simple order that the equitable
issues tendered by the answer (or counterclaim) be tried to the court and
tried first.147 Since, as we have seen,1 48 a temporary injunction would issue as
a matter of course in such a situation, there should be no room for judicial
discretion today in the matter of trial sequence. 149 And if the equitable issue is
determined in A's favor, there is no historical basis for awarding B a jury trial
on any residual legal issues.
Possible difficulties in the application of this simple pattern may be present-
ed by:
(1) a question whether the issue tendered by the defendant had worked
over into law by the time of the merger.
(2) an attempt to distinguish between equitable defenses and equitable
counterclaims. This is the product of another ill-starred piece of
statutory construction confined largely to New York, and now
repudiated there by the statute which will go into effect in the fall of
1963.10 It will be recalled that the New York Code treats the action
as the unit to be dealt with in determining mode of trial.161 Other
sections provide that all defenses (whether denials or affirmative de-
fenses) simply raise an issue in the action,'1 2 while counterclaims
are to be treated as independent actions for this purpose.'88 All
defenses, therefore, are triable as the action is triable, while the
147. Weber v. Marshall, 19 Cal. 447 (1861) ; Bodley v. Ferguson, 30 Cal. 511 (1866)
Davis v. Holbrook, 25 Colo. 493, 55 Pac. 730 (1898) ; Penninger Lateral Co., Ltd. v. Clark,
22 Idaho 397, 126 Pac. 524 (1912) ; Piggly-Wiggly Stores v. Lowenstein, 197 Ind. 62, 147
N.E. 771 (1925) ; Price v. Chambers, 148 Wash. 170, 268 Pac. 143 (1928) ; cf. Liberty Oil
Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922).
148. See note 80 supra.
149. But cf. Crosby v. Scott-Graf Lumber Co., 93 Minn. 475, 101 N.W. 610 (1904).
150. The jury trial statute set out in the text at note 55 supra has its present counterpart
in N.Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 425 (1920). This represents a change in form from the original
provision, but not in substance, so far as the present problem goes. Section 4101 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules which will take effect on September 1, 1963, however,
will completely reverse the rule which is described in the text. The new section reads:
"In the following actions, the issues of fact shall be tried by a jury ... except that equitable
defenses and equitable counterclaims shall be tried by the court." (Ital. supplied). An
enumeration follows which is reminiscent of, but not exactly like, that in the present Section
425, but adds "3. Any other action in which a party is entitled by the constitution or by ex-
press provision of law to a trial by jury." N.Y. Civ. Ppc. L. R. § 4101 (1962).
151. See text at note 55 supra. This and the following sentences in the text attempt to
describe the reasoning in Susquehanna S.S. Co. v. A. 0. Andersen & Co., 239 N.Y. 285, 146
N.E. 381 (1925).
152. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § (1920). This section is omitted from N.Y. CIV. PAc. L, R,
(1962) which will take effect on September 1, 1963. See also note 150 supra.
153. N.Y. Civ. PnAc. Ac § 424 (1920).
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mode of trial of a counterclaim is to be determined by the nature of
the counterclaim itself, not that of the action in which it is inter-
posed. Since, as we have seen, equitable matter was formerly pre-
sented by an independent suit, there is historical justification for
treating any such matter as a counterclaim. 1 4 And since the equit-
able matter usually has no greater ubstantive effect than to defeat
the law action, there is analytical justification for treating nearly all
such matter as a defense. 155 New York apparently chose the analy-
tical test; equitable matter constitutes a counterclaim only in the
relatively rare case where defendant needs something more for his
complete protection than a simple judgment in his favor (e.g., an
injunction against plaintiff's transfer of a negotiable instrument). In
most juridictions the matter of jury trial is not governed by any
distinction between defense and counterclaim but upon the historical
question whether defendant would have had to resort to equity in
order to defeat the legal claim.150
(3) a question whether an order that equitable issues be tried first is
appealable under section 1292 of the federal Judicial Code 257 as
an order granting an injunction.18 The historical basis for re-
garding it as such is clear enough, but it is doubtful whether the
reasons for making interlocutory orders dealing with injunctions
immediately appealable (as an exception to the final judgment rule)
have any application to a court's disposing of the order of judicial
business before it.
4. Civil action wherein complaint presents equitable issues and counterclaim
presents legal issues
a. Historical patterns
Where A's equitable claim against B had no factual connection with B's legal
claim against A, then each claim would require a separate action with its
own mode of trial' 59 Where there is a factual connection between the two
claims so that they present one or more common issues of fact the problem
was more complicated. There were at least two situations where this might have
been the case.
In one situation, the equity plaintiff A sought what we may call actual or
substantial equitable relief such as foreclosure of a mortgage, specific perform-
ance of a contract, an injunction against conduct (other than prosecuting a law
suit) or the like. In the other type, A sought relief which, though in personam
154. Hinton, supra note 139.
155. Cook, supra note 139.
156. See note 147 supra.
157. 28U.S.C.§1292(a) (1) (1958).
158. See Enelow v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935) (decided before merger)
(indicated appealable) ; Ettelson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 183 (1942) (held
appealable) ; City of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254 (1949) (held not appeal-
able) ; MooRn, COMMZErARY ON THE U.S. JUDIcIAL CODE 492-94 (1949).
159. Unless defendant sought to use his damage claim as a set-off against plaintiff's
equitable claim, according to the principles formerly prevailing in equity. See Savings Bank
of New London v. Santaniello, 130 Conn. 206,33 A2d 126 (1943).
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and coercive in form, was in effect a declaration of rights which would dispose
of a potential legal claim by B against A on grounds which would have been
available at law to defeat B's claim if B pursued it by legal action. In such a
case A was a putative defendant at law, and he sought in equity simply to de.
feat the law action on grounds cognizable at law. Equity jurisdiction was some-
times based on the fact that A's defense (or some other right or interest of
A) might be prejudiced by delay in the commencement of B's legal action-
either because that action was premature or because B was free to delay it for
tactical reasons.160 Equity jurisdiction was sometimes based on the desire to
prevent a multiplicity of legal actions.1 '
In either type of situation described in the previous paragraph, B might have a
legal claim against A arising out of the same operative facts (indeed in the
second type B would always have such claim). In the first type of situation
B would have a choice whether to interpose his claim in the equity suit
or to. save it for a separate action at law. The latter choice might entail de-
feat in the equity suit, but if B was willing to pay that price he could have jury
trial of the legal issues presented by his own claim. 16 2 Suppose, for example,
that A, a contractor, sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien for the amount he
claimed due for the installation of a heating plant for B, owner of the building.
If B had a claim for breach of contract because of defective installation of the
plant (including, perhaps, consequential damages in excess of the amount
claimed by A), B could use his claim to defeat or diminish the amount for
which foreclosure was sought (in which case the issues concerning A's per-
formance would be tried to the court alone). Or B could fail in the equity suit
to controvert A's performance, suffer foreclosure for the amount claimed by A
and then sue A at law for damages for breach of contract. His former pleading
(failure to deny A's performance) would be admissible against him as an ad-
mission, 13 but the former decree would not preclude him from taking a new
position and explaining to the jury why he had done so. It would not be res
160. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937), presents a typical situa-
tion. Here a life insurance policy would become incontestable, by its terms, "two years from
its date of issue," except for non-payment of premium. The insured had died but the
beneficiary was in a position to postpone her suit until after the policy had become incontest-
able. The insurance company, claiming fraud by the insured in the application for the policy,
sued for cancellation of the policy before it became incontestable. The court cited many
federal and state decisions sustaining equitable relief in similar situations. See also Enelow v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379, 384 (1935) ; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Saxe, 134 F.2d 16, 32
(D.C. Cir. 1943).
161. See, e.g., Town of Fairfield v. Southport Nat. Bank, 77 Conn. 423, 59 A. 513
(1904) ; 1 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENcE See. IV, particularly §§ 261 h el seq. 264 a,
264 b, 269 (5th ed. 1941).
162. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 260 U.S. 360 (1922) ; Relchert v.
Krass, 13 Ind. App. 348, 40 N.E. 706, 41 N.E. 835 (1895) ; Johnson Service Co. v. Kruse, 121
Minn. 28, 140 N.W. 118 (1913) ; First Nat. Bank of Miles City v. Erling Bros,, 61 S.D.
364,249 N.W. 681 (1933).
163. 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1067 (3d ed. 1940).
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judicata or collateral estoppel and it would not preclude B from later resort
to law.164
In the second situation described, where A sought equitable relief principally
to defeat a contemplated law action by B; equity would sometimes enjoin the
bringing or prosecution of a law action subsequently brought by B ; sometimes
it would not. This would depend upon all the circumstances and would rest
to a considerable extent in the discretion of the chancellor. An example would
be a suit by an insurer to cancel an insurance policy for fraud in the applica-
tion, where the policy by its terms was to become incontestible on this ground
after two years of its issuance, where the insured had died within the two
years, and where the beneficiary would have had a longer time for bringing
suit than the period of contestibility, and he had not yet brought suit. Fraud
would be a defense to a legal claim brought within the contestible period, and
so an issue triable to the jury. But the insurer needs protection against the
possibility of delay by the beneficiary beyond that time--hence its resort to
equity. Suppose now that after the equity suit was brought and still within the
contestible period the beneficiary did bring his legal action. The way was then
clear for the insurer to make its defense of fraud at law. But the beneficiary
could still defeat this defense by withdrawing his law action (which he
could do without prejudice) and bringing it again after the policy had become
incontestible.
When faced with this later, but still timely, suit by the beneficiary, equity did
not dismiss the insurer's suit (since there had been ground for equitable relief
when it was brought). Rather, it did one of two things: it either retained the
case on its docket until the insurer's defense was actually tried by jury in the
law action, or it enjoined the prosecution of the law action and proceeded to
try the fraud issue itself. The matter was said to rest within the jurisdiction of
the trial court '6 and the Supreme Court enumerated the following factors as
appropriate guides for the exercise of such discretion:
There would be many circumstances to be weighed, as, for instance,
the condition of the court calendar, whether the insurer had been pre-
cipitate or its adversaries dilatory, as well as other factors. In the end,
benefit and hardship would have to be set off, the one against the other,
and a balance ascertained. 66
This situation, which involves an issue which was traditionally cognizable in
either law or equity, is to be sharply distinguished from what we have de-
scribed above as Pattern I and its variants, wherein the threshold issue is by
tradition of exclusively equitable cognizance.
164. RESTATEmENT, JUDGMENTS § 68 (2) and comments d, ej f (1942); cf. Scott,
Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 H Av. L. REv. 1 (1942), James, Consent Judgments
as Collateral Estoppel 108 U. P. L. Rsv. 173 (1959).
165. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937) ; Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Conway, 11 N.Y.2d 367, 183 N.E2d 754 (1962) ; cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Saxe, 134
F2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
166. American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, supra note 165, at 216.
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b. Modern patterns
It was widely stated under the Codes that the interposition of a legal coun-
terclaim in an equitable action constituted a waiver by defendant of any right
to jury trial he might otherwise have on the issues tendered by the counter-
claim. 167 Any such rule-which pits one objective of a merged procedure
(economy of litigation) against another (preservation of jury trial)-is un-
fortunate. And where the counterclaim is compulsory, a rule which attaches
the consequence of waiver to its interposition would probably be unconstitu-
tional.' 68 Under later provisions for merger, like those of the Federal Rules,
it is clear that the filing of a counterclaim-whether permissive or compulsory
-- does not constitute a waiver of jury trial.169 We have also seen that (for
different reasons) it is not a waiver under the New York Civil Practice Act.
If there is no waiver in this situation, the question comes down largely to
one of whether the common issue is to be tried by the court or the jury.
Where there is no factual connection between the claims, no problem arises
since there is no common issue and each set of separate issues will be tried
in the way appropriate to it, just as was the case before merger.
Where there is such a connection and a common issue, B's legal claim will
usually be a compulsory counterclaim under the Federal Rules and their state
counterparts. 70 Where A seeks what we have called actual or substantial
equitable relief, B can no longer preserve his legal claim for a jury by saving
it out of the equity suit. The provision for compulsory counterclaim prevents
that.17' This fact should not, however, deprive B of his jury right. The best
solution, and the simplest, would be to let him exercise his option today by
simply claiming jury trial in the way provided by statute or rule. This treat-
ment would parallel that accorded A when he must join legal and equitable
claims in the same complaint.' 72 Perhaps the suggested rule gives B a wind-
fall here by letting him have a jury at a price which was less than the older
system exacted. But no one gained from the payment of that price (double
167. James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YALE L.J. 1022,
1033 (1936) ; Annot. 89 A.L.R. 1391 (1934).
168. See Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Glass, 81 F. Supp. 645, 646 (E.D. Pa. 1948) (since
rules now make defendant's counterclaim in this case compulsory, "there can be no question
of this defendant's having waived jury trial by putting in his claim as a counterclaim to an
equitable action.").
169. Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) ; Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Cheml-
Cord Proc. Co., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Black v. Boyd, 248 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1957).
170. FED. R. Crv. PROC. 13(a) which provides in part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the trans-
action or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claims ....
The quoted rule is subject to certain conditions and an exception which need not be gone into
here.
171. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim under Modern Pleading,
38 MiNN. L. Rav. 423 (1954).
172. See text accompanying notes 118-143 supra.
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litigation) and the only possible benefit from requiring it was its tendency to
restrict jury trials-which would not uniformly be regarded as a benefit.
Where A seeks equitable relief principally to defeat an action at law by B
against him on grounds cognizable as a defense at law, and where B inter-
poses the law action by way of counterclaim, fidelity to the historical pattern
would usually require that the order of trial sequence be left to the trial court's
discretion, to be guided by the kind of factors enumerated in American Lifc
Insurance Co. v. Stewart.7 3 This, it should be noted, is the only type of
situation in which history warrants the use of discretion for this purpose. 174
There is judicial authority for its use here under the merged procedure, but for
the federal courts this authority was overruled by Beacon Thcaircs v.
Westover.175
5. Civil action for declaratory judgment
We have seen that equity would sometimes grant relief which had as its
principal substantive effect the binding declaration of the rights of parties.170
But there were many situations in which equity would not grant such relief.
The putative defendant in an action for breach of contract or for negligently
causing personal injuries, who claimed to have a good defense to it, could not
get equity to determine the validity of the defense. The remedy of interposing
this defense to the law action, if and when brought, was thought adequate.""
Beginning with the 1920's a good many statutes were passed which provided
broadly for actions seeking declaratory judgments -with or without coercive re-
lief in all types of situations, including those in which equity had given relief
and those in which it had not, and including those in which plaintiff sought
simply to establish his nonliability under a claim against him as well as those
in which he sought some affirmative relief.'78
The framers of declaratory judgment acts, like the framers of merged
systems of procedure, took a neutralist position toward jury trial, seeking
173. 300 U.S. 203, 216 (1937). These are set forth in the text at note 166 .apra.
174. See text accompanying notes 79-90 & 165-166 .spra.
175. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
176. See text at notes 160, 161 and 165 supra. Other examples may be found in
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGm rrs Part I, CI. IV (2d ed. 1941) (including equitable
actions for removal of cloud from title, to impress a trust upon the legal title, to construe
wills and other instruments, for interpleader, and so on).
177. See text accompanying notes 31 & 146 supra.
178. The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and the American Bar Association in 1922, 9A
U.LA. 2 (1957). It has by now been adopted by 36 states, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands. 9 U.L.A. Cum. ANN. PocrET PART 9 (1962).
There is also a federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1958), and
one in Connecticut and in New York. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-29 (1958) ; N.Y. C17. PnAC.
Act § 473 (1943) ; N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. R. § 3001 (1962).
See BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 1039 (Appendix) (2nd ed. 1941) setting forth
some of the statutes, and some of the legislative history of the federal act.
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neither to contract nor to expand it.1 9 The courts worked out an essentially
simple test for jury trial, quite consistent with this legislative intent. Where
the declaratory judgment action did not fit into one of the existing patterns for
equitable relief, but was, so to speak, an inverted lav suit, then the parties had
a right to jury trial.3 0 Where the declaratory judgment was the counterpart of
a suit in equity, there was no such right.'18 This simple and consistent pattern
has been disrupted, for the federal courts, by the decision in Beacon Thcatrcs
v. Westover.182
In this action Fox, operator of a movie theatre in San Bernardino, Califor-
nia, sued Beacon, operator of a drive-in theatre 11 miles from San Bernardino,
seeking a declaration that Fox was not liable to Beacon for treble damages
under the antitrust laws and an injunction pendente lite to prevent Beacon from
suing Fox and its distributors under these acts. The controversy arose over
first-run clearances. Fox alleged that it had long been operating under con-
tracts with distributors granting it exclusive rights to show first-run pictures
in the "San Bernardino competitive area"; that when Beacon built its drive-in
it notified Fox that it considered these contracts to be violations of the anti-
trust laws and threatened treble damage suits thereunder; that these notices
and threats against Fox and its distributors gave rise to "duress and coercion"
which deprived Fox of its valuable property right to negotiate these contracts.
Threat of irreparable harm was charged.
179. See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 178, at 399-404. That author had a larger part in
promoting and drafting these statutes than any other individual. See United States F. & G.
Co. v. Koch, 102 F2d 288, 290 (3d Cir. 1939), referring to Borchard as the "father" of the
declaratory judgment in the United States. Borchard states:
It may be said that the draftsmen of the Uniform Act included the provision (Section
9] with the sole purpose of reporting any constitutional doubt on the point; it was
not intended to indicate that the declaratory action is either equitable or legal or to
indicate that jury trial, though demandable in common lav cases, is necessary in any
case. Declaratory relief is neither strictly equitable nor legal, although... its historical
sources are almost exclusively equitable.
BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 178, at 399.
Section 9 of the Uniform Act reads:
When a proceeding under this Act involves the determination of an issue of fact, such
issue may be tried and determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and de-
termined in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.
9A U.L.A. § 9, at 210 (1957). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
180. Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1942) ; Johnson v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 238 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Pittman v. West Am. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d
405 (8th Cir. 1962) ; Baumgartner v. Schey, 143 Colo. 373, 353 P.2d 375 (1960). See also
Aetna Cas. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 1937) ; American Lumbermens Mut.
Cas. Co., v. Timms & Howard, Inc., 108 F.2d 497, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1939); Annot., 13
A.L.R2d 777 (1950).
181. Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1942)
Linahan v. Linahan, 131 Conn. 307, 39 A2d 895 (1944) ; Hornof v. Klee, 259 Minn. 139, 106
N.W.2d 448 (1960).
The cases cited in note 180 supra all recognize this either expressly or by implication,
Cases are collected in Annot., 13 A.L.R2d 777 (1950).
182. 359U.S. 500 (1959).
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Beacon answered and counterclaimed for treble damages. A common issue
of the complaint and counterclaim was the reasonableness of the clearances
granted to Fox, which depended, in part, on the existence of competition be-
tween the two theatres. Beacon made timely demand for jury trial of all the
issues. The trial court, however, viewed the complaint as essentially equitable
and ordered the issues tendered by it (including the common issue) to be
tried by the court before jury trial of the issues tendered by the counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals refused to interfere with this ruling.' s3 It recognized
that the determination of the issue of clearances by the court would "operate
either by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to conclude both
parties with respect thereto at the subsequent trial of the treble damage
claim." s  But it concluded that since the issues tendered by the complaint
were equitable they would have warranted a chancellor in exercising his
discretion to enjoin prosecution of the later law action and that the trial judge
under the merged system had a similar discretion in ordering trial sequence.185
The Supreme Court reversed. The holding itself is not radical. Fox may
have been simply trying to circumvent Beacon's jury right by "jumping the
gun" with an equitable action; the district court's exercise of discretion may
have been so questionable as to border on abuse.'80 But on the assumptions
which the Court made (existence of a common issue and of grounds for
equitable relief) 187 the decision represented an extcnsion of defendants' jury
trial right. Traditionally this had depended (in this context) upon the
chancellor's discretion ;lms now it is made a matter of right upon issues ten-
dered both by an equitable claim and by a legal counterclaim.
Even this departure from the historical pattern is not radical, but the
grounds given for it are cloudy and ambiguous and susceptible of an in-
terpretation which would go far to abolish the historical test altogether and
extend jury trial over most of the former domain of equity.18 9
183. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 252 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1958).
184. Id. at 874.
185. Id. at 876.
186. Cf. Prudential Insurance Co. v. Saxe, 134 F.2d 16, 31-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denicd,
319 U.S. 745 (1943).
187. 359 U.S. at 503-04, 506.
188. See notes 165 & 166 supra and accompanying text.
189. Further cloudy and ambiguous reasoning is added by the Court's later opinion in
Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). Here again the actual decision is not
radical, though, again, is points to something of an extension of jury trial right. The ac-
tion was brought by owners of the trademark Dairy Queen against licensees of the trade-
mark, for alleged breaches of the licensing contract by (1) failure to make the payments it
called for, and by (2) continuing to use the trademark and collect money for that use after
its right to do so had terminated by the first breach. The complaint sought a declaration that
the contract was null and void, an accounting of profits illegally obtained since the first
breach, and a permanent injunction restraining defendant from using the trademark within
the.area of the exclusive license and from executing sub-licensing agreements to others
which would thus infringe plaintiff's rights. McCullough v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 194 F. Supp.
686, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1961). Defendants admitted the contract and claimed that there had
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For one thing, the Court argues, injunction against defendant's lawsuit is
not needed for plaintiff's full protection under the merged procedure; and the
remedies open to plaintiff under the Federal Rules make his remedy at law
adequate, thereby undercutting his need for equitable relief.100 This of course is
true in a sense, not only here but in a fairly wide class of cases wherein the main
thrust of the equity suit was to defeat a potential legal claim on grounds cogniz-
been a novation under which there was no breach. Defendant also claimed that plaintiffs,
because of violations of the antitrust laws, had come into court with unclean hands. Ibid.
The District Court regarded the complaint as one claiming equitable relief and struck
defendant's demand for jury. Id. at 687-88.
Defendant; licensee, then sought mandamus to compel the district judge to vacate thin
order. The Court of Appeals denied this request without opinion, but the Supreme Court
reversed this judgment and indicated that the writ should issue. 369 U.S. at 479-80.
The Court held that 'insofar as the complaint requests a money judgment it presents a
claim which is unquestionably legal." Id. at 476. And since "the factual issues related to
the question of whether there has been a breach of contract," are presented by this legal
claim as well by the claims for equitable relief "the legal claims involved in the action must
be determined prior to any final court determination of respondents' equitable claims." Id.
at 479.
The reasoning of the majority opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Black, purported to rest
on history, but it ignored half the historical picture. Reliance was placed on two cases de-
cided under the former procedure in which the Supreme Court had upheld the right to jury
trial of the issue of debt vel non where unsecured contract creditors sought equitable aid in
collecting their claims. Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891) ; Cates v. Allen, 149 'U.S. 451
(1893). These decisions were said to scotch the notion that legal issues may be tried without
a jury because they are "incidental" to equitable issues. 369 U.S. at 470-71. This notion, it
was suggested, was a latter-day gloss, introduced by courts which had lost their way in the
merged procedure created by the federal rules.
The Court concludes from this its reaffirmation of the broad principle in Beacon "that
where both legal and equitable issues are presented in a single case, 'only under the most
imperative circumstances ... can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through
prior determination of equitable claims.'" Id. at 472-73.
What the Court fails-or refuses-to see is that the Scott and Gates cases represent only
one of the patterns followed by equity-the one we have called pattern II-and what is said
is true, historically, only of that pattern. In other situations (probably including that in both
Beacon and Dairy Queen) equity would frequently have tried without a jury the very kinds
of legal issues which were presented in those cases. See, e.g., Marsh v. Seymour, 97 U.S. 348
(1878); Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Nat. Bank, 260 U.S. 235 (1922); American Life Ins.
Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203 (1937).
This departure from history seems to have been clearly grasped by Judge Wisdom in
Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Proc. Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961), where
he said: "It is therefore immaterial that the case at bar contains a stronger basis for equitable
relief than was present in Beacon Theatres. It would make no difference if the equitable
cause clearly out-weighed the legal cause so that the basic issue of the case taken as a whole
is equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved the jury right it creates controls. This
is the teaching of Beacon Theatres, as we construe it." Cf. also Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Brodish, 200 F. Supp. 777, 778 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
The Court in Dairy Queen quoted Judge Wisdom's language with apparent approval.
369 U.S. at 473 n.8. The ambiguity in Dairy Queen's reasoning lies in the doubt whether
the Court will continue to ignore the equitable half of history consistently and completely,
or, if not, just where it will draw the new line.
190. 359 U.S. at 507-09.
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able at law. The Court mentions "such equitable remedies as Bills of Peace, Quia
Timet and Injunction' 191 in this connection. Interpleader (where the grounds of
the adverse claimants' claims are legal) would be another example, reformation
still another. In all such cases modem systems substitute direct procedures for
the cumbersome and circuitous injunction against lawsuits.1920 But these
beneficial short cuts of the blended procedures have not generally been looked
on as legal remedies in a sense which would disrupt the historical pattern of
jury trial. Rather they have been regarded as aimed at improving judicial ad-
ministration without disturbing the previous balance between jury and non-
jury trial.
-Even more disturbing is the Court's treatment of the Declaratory Judgment
Act as. providing a legal remedy which "necessarily affects the scope of
equity."a9 3 As we have seen, the remedy provided by this Act is available in a
wide variety of situations covering nearly the while spectrum of what used to
be law and equity. It would be a proper vehicle for tendering issues which
have traditionally been exclusively equitable as well as issues, like those in
Beacon Theatres, which might appear in either a legal or equitable context and
were sometimes tried to a jury. A claim of mutual mistake, for an accounting
between partners, for a trust accounting or for advice by a trustee, to name
only a few examples, could all be presented by an action for declaratory judg-
ment.19 4 Indeed it is hard to think of an equitable claim that might not be. To
be sure, coercive relief would often be needed for complete protection, but the
Court recognized this possibility also in Beacon Theatres and showed that it
could be taken care of by a temporary injunction pending jury determina-
tion of the issues of fact and by permanent injunction thereafter, if that was
needed.195 Presumably, then, the "legal remedy" would be inadequate only in
a case where permanent equitable relief would be needed before a jury could
determine factual issues-a rare case indeed.
It is true, as the Court implied,"' that the Declaratory Judgment Act was
not intended to expand the scope of equity jurisdiction or diminish anyone's
right to jury trial. But it is just as true, as the dissent points out and the
majority opinion simply ignores, that the "Act merely provided a new statu-
tory remedy, neither legal nor equitable, but available in the areas of both
equity and law."' 97 And it is equally clear that the Act, like the systems of
merger, was meant to preserve, not to expand, the right to jury trial.
191. Id. at 509.
192. Or, where an injunction is actually needed it may always be granted on a tempor-
ary basis until the legal claim is determined by a jury. 359 U.S. at 503; cf. Dairy Queen,
Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,479 (1962).
193. 359 U.S. at 509.
194. The breadth of the remedy may be seen from BORCHARD, Dsc ARAToRy JuDG-
MENTS (1934).
195. 359 U.S. atS08,510.
196. Id. at 504.
197. Id. at 515.
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Probably the majority of the Court did not mean that the declaratory judg-
ment remedy had swallowed up all (or nearly all) the realm of equity and
extended jury trial to all civil actions. The reasoning suggests this as a
possibility, but probably it was meant to be confined to cases where declaratory
relief is sought to forestall a law action;19O and if that is the meaning, this
part of the argument has no broader implications than that which reasons from
the expansion of legal remedies by the Federal Rules.
Even if this narrow interpretation is to be put on Beacon Theatres, it stands
for what has been described above as a flexible rather than static rendering of the
constitutional test, for the Court makes it clear that the constitutional right
to a jury attaches to those areas wrested from "the scope of equity" by "ex-
pansion of adequate legal remedies provided by the Declaratory Judgment Act
and the Federal Rules."' 9 The present Court, which heavily favors the jury
trial, will no doubt use this flexibility always to expand jury trial. The prece-
dent for flexibility once firmly set, however, may be used by some future court
to curtail jury trial by expanding concepts associated with the former equity
jurisdiction.
III. CONCLUSION
The foregoing treatment proposes in effect a fairly close judicial adherence
to the historical test in determining the right to jury trial in the modem civil
action, with any flexibility confined rather strictly to developments which fall
within patterns, already blocked out by history. But it is natural that many will
be impatient with a test at once so conservative and timid, and also so dif-
ficult to apply (especially in a generation which has so little concern with
legal history). It is therefore natural that competing notions should emerge.
These should be examined.
(a) An eclectic test. No one has explicitly suggested re-examination of the
whole matter with a view to determining what issues or types of issues are
best fitted for court trial or jury trial. If all were tabula rasa, and some solon
were trying to devise an ideal system for the administration of justice, he
would probably approach the jury trial problems with just such an inquiry
in mind.2 0 0 And it may well guide the future course of those charged with
198. The federal cases which have cited and relied on Beacon have gone no further than
this to date. See, e.g., Pittman v. West American Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1962) ;
Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-Cord Proc. Co., 294 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Minnesota Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Brodish, 200 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Pa. 1962) ; Mitchell v. Michigan-U.S. Ind.
G. & L. Co., 189 F. Supp. 411 (E.D. Mich. 1960) ; Payne Land & Livestock Co. v. Archuleta,
180 F. Supp. 651 (D. N.M. 1960) ; Inland Steel Prod. Co. v. MPH Mfg. Co., 25 F.R.D. 238
(N.D. Ill. 1959).
199. 359 U.S. at 509. After pointing out how the remedies provided by the Federal Rules
and the Declaraiory Judgment Act necessarily affect the scope of equity and call for recon-
sideration of the availability of equitable remedies, the Court continues: "This is not only
in accord with the spirit of the Rules and the Act but is required by the provision in the
Rules that '[t]he right to trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution [... ] of the United States shall be preserved... inviolate.'" Id. at 509-10.
200. Cf. Note, The Right to a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1176, 1190 (1961).
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amending or recasting constitutions or, within narrower compass, of legisla-
tors. But as a guide for judicial, as opposed to political, action in the matter
any such test meets serious difficulties. For one thing the constitutions them-
selves, as we have seen, impose a different test (namely an historical test
which was never guided, even in the making, by the consideration here sug-
gested as ideal). Furthermore, even if the matter is left to the people acting
through their legislators, they lack any scientific way of telling what issues
are best suited for jury or for court trial,201 and there is no general agreement
(among judges, among politicians, within the profession, or in the community
at large) about the matter or even about the underlying premises that should
be assumed in making the evaluation.20 2 These difficulties seem to this writer
quite insurmountable and indeed they should, it is submitted, inhibit judges
from feeling free to take the bit in their teeth.20 3 Nevertheless it is natural and
inevitable that a court's own value judgments will influence its decisions in
dose and doubtful cases.
(b) The basic nature of the issue test. This test has been proposed by
Professor Moore and approved by a number of courts. - 4 The trouble with
it is that it furnishes no guide for telling what the basic nature of an issue is.
There are some issues, to be sure, that would usually (perhaps always) arise
201. The studies made by Kalven, Zeisel, and others at Chicago bid fair to making a
serious and worth-while contribution to this knowledge but the reports of them to date are
incomplete. See, e.g., Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Danage Atward,
19 OHIO ST. L.J. 158 (1958), ZEis., KALvrr AND BucsroLz, DELAY IN THE CouRTs,
Preface (1959).
202. This is a matter on which opinions have been deeply divided for a long time. Per-
haps the most thoughtful recent attack on the jury's worth is to be found in FRnNr, CoURTs
ON TIAL (1949).
Contrast the favorable point of view expressed in the sources cited in James, Tort Law
in Midstream: Its Challenge to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFFALo L. Rnv. 315, 342-43 (1959).
The controversy continues to rage at many levels. See, e.g., Green, Juries and Justice-
The Jury's Role in Personal Injury Cases, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 152; Hogan, Joseph Story on
Juries, 37 OR. L. RPv. 234 (1958) ; Flynn, Public Preference for the Jury, 22 N.Y. ST. BAR
Ass'N J. 103 (1960) ; Steinitz, A Condemnation of the Jury System and a Possible Alterna-
tive,21 U. Prrrs. L. Rnv. 52 (1959).
203. A wise and temperate judicial appraisal of the problem was made by Judge Clark,
dissenting, in Damsky v. Zavatt, 289 F.2d 46,59 (2d Cir. 1961) :
Of course American lawyers and judges have found the jury of immense value in
assuming the burden of adjudicating troublesome issues of fact, notably in criminal
and in negligence cases. But it is not showing care for the jury to force it into classes
of claims where the right is dubious and the use inconvenient and burdensome. The
present strain on juries in the cases where it is most needed is such that true believers
should pause before they push it too far. The delays and court congestion of the jury
calendars are a source of increasing tension, the long waits and infrequent sittings are
a burden to the conscientious juror and lead him increasingly to avoid service, and
Congress is regularly objecting to what it considers the undue cost of juries and
cutting the appropriations therefor.
204. 5 MooPR, FEDERAL. PRACTICE ff 38.16 (2d ed. 1951). Cases adopting this approach
and citing Moore's treatise are cited in the footnotes to the second edition and in the current
supplement
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only in equity (e.g., mutual mistake as a basis for reformation; existence of
facts which would warrant surcharge of an express trustee, etc.). Others would
always, or nearly always, arise only at law (e.g., negligent operation of an
automobile). Such issues may well enough be called basically equitable or
legal, as the case may be. But they pose no serious problem as to mode of
trial and no special test need be formulated for them. It is only when an issue
was cognizable in either law or equity, depending on the context, that prob-
lems are presented and a test needed. Such issues are not inherently legal or
equitable. They are like chameleons which take their color from surrounding
circumstances. When applied to such issues, the basic nature test has been
called a subjective one, leaving the court free to find either way.20 But the
test was probably not meant to leave matters thus at large and there are at
least three ways in which it can be given objective content: (1) The basic
nature of an issue could be defined in terms of the appropriate mode of trial
for that issue. In this way the present test would be equated to the one just
described as the eclectic test. This is clearly not what is meant. (2) An issue
could be defined as basically legal whenever it is one that is regularly tried
by a jury, though not uniformly. This would mean that an issue like fraud
in the inducement, or contract ve -non would be basically of a legal nature.
This is not what the author of the test intended,20 6 though the notion could
be justified on an assumption of the superiority of jury trial, at least wherever
there was some basis of experience with it upon an issue. If fraud, for in-
stance, had long been tried to a jury in some cases, this must indicate that it
is a practical way to try this issue. Therefore, since its superiority as a mode
of trial is assumed, it should be extended to the issue of fraud wherever it is
raised. A variant of this notion would be to regard an issue as basically legal
wherever it is a common issue tendered by both an equitable suit and a legal
counterclaim. The assumption of the superiority of jury trials probably consti-
tutes the basis of the Supreme Court's current position, though it is not formu-
lated in terms of "the basic nature of an issue." Indeed the majority opinion
in Beacon Theatres rejects the basic nature test. (3) The basic nature of an
issue could be defined in terms of its context in the light of history. This
would equate it with the historical test. This is apparently what Professor
Moore means, as the illustrations he gives suggest. But if it is, then it adds
nothing helpful or clarifying. Instead it adds confusion by suggesting either
unbridled choice or irrelevant inquires and in either event it tempts an ex-
cursion down some primose path.
(c) The test of discretion. Trial courts have and should have some discre-
tion in prescribing the order of the business before them. This is confirmed and
extended for the federal courts by Rule 42(b) which empowers a court to
order separate trials of separate issues. Some courts have suggested that this
205. See Note, 47 C.nw. L. REv. 760, 762 (1959) ("The determination as to which i's
the basic issue appears arbitrary."); Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 603, 606 (1960) ("The deter-
mination would depend entirely upon the individual attempting to apply the test.").
206. Thus Professor Moore states that the basic nature of the issue in patent litigation
will depend upon the patentee's choice of remedy, 5 MooRE op. cit. .rpra note 204, at 151,
and that the choice of remedy as between damages and specific performance will govern the
nature of such issues as contract vel non. Id. at 152.
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discretion provides the solution for the problems of jury trial where an issue is
tendered which would be cognizable either at law or in equity and one party
claims a jury.20 7 But discretion cannot determine whether a strict constitu-
tional right is to be accorded. And since the constitution preserves the jury
right as it existed historically, then discretion may constitutionally be employed
to deny a jury trial only where a court of equity would have (or might have)
enjoined an action at law under the old system. Moreover, unless merger is to
be used as a cloak for extending jury trial in a way that the framers of merger
did not contemplate, then discretion has no place in determining whether a
common issue is to be tried to the jury, except where a court of equity would
have exercised discretion in deciding whether to enjoin an action at law. This
was the case in only one narrow type of situation, as we have seen; namely,
where A brings an equity suit to establish what would be a good legal defense
to B's potential law suit, and the ground of equitable jurisdiction was the
avoidance of multiple actions or of hardship caused by the possible delay in
bringing B's action. It was precisely in this situation that the Supreme Court
virtually eliminated the availability of judicial discretion to determine whether
a common issue shall be tried by jury. This ruling does not, of course, bind
state courts2 08 Nor would it prevent a federal court from exercising discretion
in determining the order in which court and jury issues are to be tried in many
cases (as where these are all different issues). But apparently there is little or
no room for discretion in the federal courts to decide whether any given issue
is to be tried by a jury by the device of controlling trial sequence.
207. See, e.g., Tanimura v. United States, 195 F.2d 329 (9th Cir. 1952); Orenstein
v. United States, 191 F2d 184, 190 (1st Cir. 1951).
208. So far Beacon has created scarcely a ripple in the state courts. It has been cited
altogether less than a half dozen times. SHFPARms, U.S. CrrATr xs 423 (Jan. 1963). And only
three decisions in which it was cited have any significance for present purposes. In Tem-
perance Ins. Exch. v. Carver, 83 Idaho 487, 493, 365 P. 2d 824, 827, 828 (1961), it was cited
twice; once for the proposition: . . . the trial of issues of fact incidental to the exercise of
rights and remedies granted by the declaratory judgment act, are generally triable before
the court without a jury"; the second time for the proposition: "However, when issues of
fact triable by jury under the common law or territorial statute, arise in declaratory pro-
ceedings, the procedure must be such as to preserve the right of jury trial."
In Pheonix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Conway, 11 N.Y. 2d 367, 371, 183 N.E. 2d 754, 756
(1962), the court, after sustaining an order for court trial first as a proper exercise of dis-
cretion in a situation like that in the Stewart case, note 189 mipra, cites Stewart as authority,
and concludes "Cf. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover...."
In Romero v. King, 368 Mich. 45, 55, 117 N.W. 2d 119, 124 (1962), it was cited in Mr.
Justice Black's opinion for one-half of a divided court, for the proposition that Dairy
Queen and Beacon called for a "scrutinous reexarination" of the decision in Style v. Green-
slade, 364 Mich. 679, 112 N.W. 2d 92 (1961). Style reaffirmed a Michigan rule (seldom
found elsewhere) that a challenge to a release of a claim for personal injuries, on grounds of
fraud and overreaching, presented an equitable issue for determination by the court alone.
The Michigan Court has recently adopted rules modeled on the federal rules. The justices
who agreed with Mr. Justice Black apparently believe that this step, coupled w.ith the recent
Supreme Court opinions, calls for repudiation of the peculiar Michigan rule found in Style,
and its replacement by the widely prevailing rule that a defense or avoidance grounded on
fraud is triable to the jury when presented in the context of a common law action. See Bowie
v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1953); Annot., 43 A.LR2d 786 (1955). Compare note
31 supra.
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